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 In U.S. America and much of the Western world, natural is a venerated symbolic 
placeholder for any number of assumed virtues and ideals. Present conflicts have brought 
forward questions about what natural (which I argue functions as an ideograph) should mean in 
contexts that seem to call for a formal, enforceable definition. In this study, I use the vocabulary 
of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) and the context of bodybuilding to work towards a theory of how 
ambiguous ideographs become "striated" or “crystallized.” Within this discussion I present 
instances where natural has been employed as a vehicle to cause harm, and I offer an advisement 
to rhetorical scholars on how we might approach striated ideographs in the future. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE STAGE 
On September 27th, 2013, one of the most hyped professional bodybuilding contests of 
all time was set to begin at the Paradise Casino and Resort in Las Vegas, Nevada. Though a 
handful of athletes were legitimately contending for the title, it had been marketed worldwide as 
the ultimate showdown between two legends: Jay vs. Phil. Jay Cutler, four-time champion and 
the most recognized name in the sport, was making his return from a devastating biceps injury 
that had kept him off the stage and forced him to relinquish his crown. In the meantime, “The 
Gift,” Phil Heath, had become the dominant presence in the sport. Today he was attempting to 
defend his Mr. Olympia title for the second time. A third contender, crowd favorite Kai Greene, 
was hopeful that he would finally be able to break through his streak of three consecutive runner-
up finishes. All three competitors made it to the final grouping in a field that was more 
competitive than anticipated.  
Ten thousand rowdy bodybuilding enthusiasts packed the Orleans Arena to capacity for 
the final pose-offs and results. As the final tiered groupings were called onto the stage, fans 
loudly urged judges toward their favorite for the gold medal. Kai Green appeared more prepared 
than ever and received thunderous applause. Jay Cutler showed that he still had a body to be 
reckoned with. However, he was unable to live up to the massive amount of hype surrounding 
him and finished 6th, still not fully on track from his season lost to injury. In the end, Phil Heath 
won the event again with his massive 23-inch biceps, and miniscule 29-inch waist packed into a 
rock hard 5’9’’ 255 lb. frame that held only 6 percent body fat (Smith, 2013). With this title, 
Heath won $250,000, the largest prize ever awarded in a bodybuilding competition. This was a 
part of a record $1 million total winnings given out across the seven Olympia events (Black, 
2013). Commentators remarked that this result signaled a new era in men’s professional 
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bodybuilding, and that we should appreciate this moment where we are witness to one of the 
most muscular, most symmetrical bodies of all time. As in every other Olympia event, neither 
Phil nor any competitor was subjected to drug testing. 
Meanwhile, just two weeks prior on September 14th, 2013, urine tests were administered 
in preparation for the Victorian Natural Physique Championships being held in Melbourne, 
Australia. One of the competition’s top performers and favorites, Marc Marcoccia, registered a 
testosterone count of 16.9 to 1, nearly three times the maximum value. Further testing revealed 
that Marc was also positive for the endogenous reference compound pregnanedio, a metabolic 
result of steroid usage (“Hall of Shame,” 2013). After deliberation by the governing body of the 
sport, the International Natural Bodybuilding Association (INBA) committee deemed that the 
appropriate action was to ban Marc for life from competing in any other natural bodybuilding 
events. Marc forfeited his chance to win the prize: a 10-foot trophy. He was also denied return of 
his $150 entry fee. Never again could Marc claim to be a “natural” bodybuilder. Today his 
picture is a highlighted entry in the INBA website’s “Hall of Shame.” While impressively lean 
and aesthetically built, Marc’s measurements were all significantly smaller than Heath and the 
other finalists of the Olympia event. 
It seems that the INBA is fairly protective of the depiction of natural that is displayed on 
the medal stands of their events. To this day, every instance of an adult failing a test has resulted 
in a lifetime disqualification and a revocation of any prizes won. The competition for Mr. 
Olympia, however, has never had an instance where an athlete has been disqualified for 
performance-enhancing substance use. This is because the Olympia events do not explicitly 
claim naturalness for their competitors, nor do they test to determine what substances are 
entering the athletes’ bodies. To this group, natural is a plot of ground best left undisturbed. The 
3 
	
growth, and the process of becoming something beyond expected human limitation, is what is 
held sacred. The methods of achieving these alterations are not. This dissertation project 
discusses rhetorical and philosophical constructions of natural and the consequences these 
constructions might offer. It seems bodybuilding, and the structures it creates around what is 
natural and what is not, may hold insight into what influences larger perceptions about what a 
natural human body is and is not allowed to be. If we investigate the process further, it is 
possible to learn what can and does happen when we regulate powerful, value-laden words such 
as natural.   
Hardening the Natural Body 
Perhaps some of us have noticed people cringe when they see the cover model of a 
muscle magazine. Many of us have witnessed someone express disgust at the sight of a female 
bodybuilder who no longer appears feminine enough to the onlooker, or have heard mutterings 
about a physique at the beach that looks too good to be true. In these situations, the refrain 
“that’s just not natural” often arises. Inside of the sport of bodybuilding, much of this type of 
outrage is directed towards those who claim their bodies to be natural, and naturally developed, 
and then directly violate the governing body’s imposed definition of natural. The sin is the 
appearance of competitors’ deceit, hypocrisy, and exposure. The acts involved in illegal drug 
usage are largely an afterthought. The communicative process of deciding what natural means 
ends up being a delicate issue in a sport largely concerned with brawn.  
Within bodybuilding circles and elsewhere, bodies are lumped into particular categories. 
Within these categories they may be venerated for their appearance and accomplishments or 
discarded and shamed for their actions or attributions. The difference in the categorization of 
these bodies is often not necessarily factually grounded. Rather, it depends on semi-arbitrary 
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definitions involving subjective types of evidence. Interpreting this evidence means embarking 
toward a determination of whether a body is natural or unnatural, a designation that offers a 
potential lifetime of reverberating consequences. This meaning-making potential assures that the 
repercussions of defining natural within bodybuilding, or choosing not to do so, will go far 
beyond the awaited results of individual competitors’ urine tests.  
For this project, I will use the context of bodybuilding to provide a larger argument about 
what occurs when constructions of a value-laden term, in this case natural, begin to “crystallize” 
or take recognizable regulatory form. I will first discuss how natural functions as what McGee 
(1980) refers to as an ideograph. Next, I intend to return the conversation to how <natural> is 
deployed in bodybuilding subculture. Following, I will trace histories of formalized usages of 
<natural> in order to illustrate the power this particular ideograph holds. Next, I intend to use the 
vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) to develop a further understanding of what is 
happening as “striations” (or clearly developed boundaries) appear around an otherwise 
ambiguous ideograph. I conclude by offering a directive for approaching crystallizing ideographs 
in a “machinic” (Coonfield, 2006) way that may prove applicable across contexts. 
Though the context I use to discuss <natural> bodies is bodybuilding, there are several 
places in this study where I will invoke other conflicts of bodily naturalness for consideration. I 
intend my argument to implicate the potentials of <natural> for their relation to issues such as 
racial inequalities, gender/sexual-based violence, and discrimination based on (dis)ability status. 
It is my objective to offer an analytic lens that encourages the reader to periodically “try these 
issues on” to my line of argument about constructions of <natural> and locate the parallels 
within other pressing issues of defined human naturalness. For this reason, I will at times, both 
point to the implications of these issues directly, and at other times strategically allow the reader 
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to locate the parallels that he/she finds most applicable. As communication scholars, I believe 
that the way we discuss and classify bodies always has meaningful material consequences both 
within the immediate context of study and beyond the scope of what we may first consider.  
Statement of Authorship 
 Before progressing further, I find it necessary to expressly locate myself within this 
scholarship. I do this in an attempt show my relation to the subject, and to establish a point of 
reference as I refer to observations, practices, and decisions I have confronted and continue to 
interact with. I will first say that, out of respect to those who compete in the sport of 
bodybuilding, I do not rightly consider myself a bodybuilder in any real way. I have for the last 
three years, however, undertaken an extensive project of body re-building using bodybuilding 
techniques and philosophies. These practices first emerged as a health-related hobby and then 
evolved into a type of personalized approach to considering my life circumstances. At a 
particularly intense period of time I ate very little and exercised away whatever I did consume. It 
was a grueling process of positive self-discipline, unhealthy commitment nearing obsession, and 
enlightening self-discovery. I watched as my body dropped 30 lbs (from 189 to 159) in a two-
month span. I then rebuilt my physique over the next several months through resistance training, 
goal oriented planning, and a more realistic, but still restricted, caloric intake. Eventually I 
achieved a weight around 175 at a lower percentage of body fat. Today my pursuit of a re-
imagined body continues, and my goals and abilities continue to shift.  
I do not claim my experience to be typical, representative, or close to the standard of any 
level of competitive bodybuilding. I do feel, however, that my research and depth of experience 
gives me a unique, if incomplete, insight into a part of bodybuilding subculture. This experience 
has also necessarily influenced the way I view and understand constructions of <natural>. I have 
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confronted questions of my own bodily naturalness within a culture and subculture of 
muscularity and masculinity, and I have spent much time pondering its significance. From this 
experience, I have learned much and realized I have much left to learn. I will, throughout this 
project, commit to a scattering of personal voice that speaks to my understanding and nuanced 
involvement with the topic matter. I will share vignettes and observations to elaborate my own 
place within the context of this study and to illustrate my arguments. I do this as a reminder that 
theoretical arguments always concern real people. Also, I intend to use my experiences to add 
texture to the rhetorical vocabulary I employ throughout this study. In the following section I 
begin to outline the theoretical backdrop of my study by discussing how <natural> operates as an 
ideograph. 
An Ideograph, Naturally 
Renowned rhetorical scholar Michael Calvin McGee first used the term ideograph in his 
1980 contribution to the Quarterly Journal of Speech entitled “The ‘Ideograph’: A link between 
rhetoric and ideology.” In this piece, he uses ideograph to describe a mode of entry for particular 
words and phrases into widespread political consciousness. He contends that a few abstract, 
dogmatically drenched words enter discourse in a way that effectively captures, creates, and/or 
reinforces particular ideological positions. McGee sees the ideograph as a way of understanding 
how specific, pointed uses of political language relate to more abstract ideas of public ideology. 
This relation draws power from the term’s linguistic standing and harnesses the power to 
influence perception about concrete issues.  
Ideographs are thus uniquely potent elements of persuasion. Condit and Lucaites (1993) 
add, “Ideographs represent, in condensed form, the normative, collective commitments of the 
members of a public” (p. 83) and they “typically appear in public argumentation as the necessary 
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motivations or justifications for action performed in the name of the public” (p. 84). Ideographs 
are capable of encapsulating thoughts, feelings, and politics into the needlepoint of a single word 
or phrase such that they become especially difficult to dismiss from a position of conventional 
ideology. The term has now been employed across rhetorical studies. Ideographs (identifiable by 
their encasing chevrons) continue to be unearthed in diverse areas by scholars, in some cases, 
across disciplines. Examples include <liberty>, <property>, (McGee, 1980), <equality> (Condit 
& Lucaites, 1993), <human rights> (Stuckey & Ritter, 2007) and even <cigarettes> (Moore, 
1997) and <schizophrenia> (Kim & Berrios, 2001). 
Ideographs hold special rhetorical and communicative significance because they allow 
communication scholars the ability to study political ideology by examining specific enactments 
of language use. Rhetorical critics can explicitly show how key words and phrases in political 
discourse reveal underlying cultural commitments and values. Through the ideograph, McGee 
(1980) offers a tool for understanding highly abstract concepts of ideology. This course of study 
is uniquely communication driven and distinct from, perhaps, an etymological discussion of 
language, the difference being that the ideograph is concerned with the creation and practice of 
meaning making, not the temporal evolution of the word itself. The ideograph is a study of active 
rhetorical, communicative practice.  
McGee (1980) stops short of listing particular itemized standards for what constitutes an 
ideograph. Rather, he leaves it up to the critic to argue that a term “shows mutability between 
contexts” (p. 8) in such a way that underscores the term’s rhetorical weight. It is through 
engagement with the places in which a particular term or phrase appears that proves its 
ideographic qualities. I argue that due to the inherently ambiguous and rhetorically powerful 
personality of <natural>, it too functions as an ideograph. In the next section I illustrate the 
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required mutability of <natural> in ideological discourse. I use this discussion as a precursor into 
my investigation of the term’s more standardized usage within bodybuilding and its potential for 
impact in contexts beyond. McGee argues that the study of an ideograph should “never be 
limited to its use in formal discourse” (p. 9). I take up this challenge to explore the various 
avenues where <natural> is used in this nation. I also strive to highlight the connections and 
theoretical distance between <natural> and the human body. From here I will focus my argument 
on how <natural>, as an ideograph, becomes potentially dangerous whenever it enters into 
particular contexts (like bodybuilding and law) that dictate what it means to be a <natural> 
human. 
Natural in the U.S. American Cultural Consciousness 
It certainly appears that <natural> and the human body are rarely more distant that one 
degree of separation, even if this degree is their direct opposition. What is <natural> is 
distinguished from both the human and the cultural, but also works as the concept through which 
we as Westerners culturally judge other such concepts (Soper, 1998). <Natural>, as an ideal, 
appears to be at once both essentially human and entirely human-averse. Thus <natural> carries 
“an immensely complex and contradictory symbolic load” that continues to be difficult to sift 
through (Soper, 1998, p. 2).  
Thinkers such as Lukács, Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas have long 
struggled over where exactly humans and social processes fit into what is <natural> with few 
agreed results (Vogel, 1996). In his own attempt, Foucault (1978) once described the distinction 
between natural and unnatural (the perverse) not as any metaphysical requirement, but as an 
effect of discourse. He explains, “There is no [inherent] reference to a common natural 
foundation. People are not perverse or ‘mad’ naturally, but rather by way of categorization.” (p. 
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14). <Natural> can thus be considered a type of human byproduct. Perhaps, as a conceptual 
grounding, an understanding of <natural> is necessary in some respects, but it can never be 
entirely separated from the human discourse it emerges from. From Foucault’s comments we 
could reason that one thing that is certainly not <natural>, is our current conceptualization of 
nature and the <natural>.     
The U.S. American public understandably seems to struggle with conceptions of 
<natural> as well. <Natural> is as complicated as it is common. As Soper (1998) states, “its 
complexity is concealed by the ease and regularity with which we put it to use in a wide variety 
of contexts. It is at once both familiar and extremely elusive” (p. 1). We grasp at <natural>, but 
distrust whatever it is we are able to capture. At the same time, this difficulty does not seem to 
have dissolved our collective interest. In 2008, Mintel’s Global New Products Database found 
that all-natural was the second most used claim on new U.S. American food products (Shanker, 
2008). A recent study by the Shelton Group, an advertising company focusing on sustainability, 
found that “natural” is the most popular, or at least most recognized, sales pitch when it comes to 
food labeling. When the study asked, “Which is the best description to read on a food label?” 
nearly 25 percent of consumers answered, “100 percent natural” (Shanker, 2008).  U.S. 
Americans seem to agree that putting <natural> things into our bodies is preferential action. 
What exactly these <natural> things are, however, is less widely agreed upon. Those asked to 
discern the qualities of a <natural> product are often unable to define <natural> beyond a 
description of “not artificial” (Shanker, 2008). Our knowledge of <natural> remains primarily 
defined by its contrast toward that which it is determined not to be.  
One way to attempt this exclusion is by valorizing <natural> through a deployment of a 
theoretical set of phenomena which are thought to be given before any prior human contact. If 
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we haven’t messed with it, it is <natural> and so, better. This is consistent with Testa and 
Harris’s (2005) analysis that found that “people regularly claim that the natural is superior to the 
artificial or synthetic without any real grounding for the separation of the two. They know butter 
is natural and margarine is artificial and thus, butter is better” (p. 178). The question remains, 
how much human interference is enough to make this type of binary distinction? U.S. Americans 
seem to have a longing for the natural, but have difficulty pinning down what exactly this desire 
looks like. 
This difficulty is likely lodged within a paradoxical historical relationship that has 
produced the current understanding of what <natural> constitutes. As Eder and Ritter 
demonstrate in their 1996 book The Social Construction of Nature, the conceptions of nature we 
seem to operate from now find their roots in a flawed imagining of an ecological nature. This 
ecological understanding presumes all of nature to be a space defined by its lack of human 
interference even as nature is delineated and created through this same human interference. 
Simultaneously, there is said to be an internal part of humans that must remain tethered to the 
natural world. This explains, in part, the collective desire for consuming the “natural” food items 
we prefer. Somehow nature is, in a sense, both that which we are not and that which we are 
within.  
This illogicality is also the struggle between many western Marxists and thinkers like 
Engels. These parties have long disagreed about whether <natural> is an observable state or a 
type of social dialectic (Vogel, 1996). Collectively, it seems we want to remain a part of 
<natural> but want <natural> to be theoretically absent and untainted by humanness. Obviously, 
this is a difficult proposition. Norman (1996) writes, “The injunction to not interfere with nature 
in terms of the ‘natural/human’ contrast would rule out the morality of every conceivable human 
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action” (p. 86). Through this logic, the ideograph <natural> is human-made, but somehow what 
<natural> describes is a state devoid of humanness. <Natural> is thus a state never fully 
reachable. The closer humanity comes to the <natural>, the less <natural>, and less desirable, 
this thing becomes. Yet, most Western civilizations have also developed a standard for humanity 
that surpasses actions found in nature. Humans are morally, and often legally, obligated to live 
above the constraints of what is considered natural. John Stuart Mill once denounced instinctual 
action all together as “the actions of the wickedest of men,” and Bauldelaire pronounced that we 
will find nothing in the wholly natural person that “is not ghastly” (Soper, 1998). 
This contradictory definition leaves an ideographic <natural> as an idea that can only be 
viewed and understood from a distance. For Sider (1995), this means that analyzing perfect 
naturalness is not possible, for naturalness will always remain a relative matter. From this 
perspective it is more right to question to what extent <natural> can be attributed at all to nature 
since its delineations are at best inconsistent and more than likely always a product of 
convenience and agenda. It is unfortunate then, that when naturalness is named and enforced, it 
is often done in binary ways. Legally speaking, a person is either a naturalized citizen or they are 
not. Similarly, a food product is deemed either worthy of a label reading “all natural” or it is not. 
A bodybuilder’s urine and blood reveal that their body is <natural> or it is not. The disparity 
between the continuum of where <natural> exists and the dualistic way it is deployed may 
account for much of the confusion surrounding what the ideograph can and should mean.  
Nevertheless, we continue to adore naturalness. Rozin et al. (2004) found that U.S. 
Americans believed <natural> to be healthier, more appealing to the senses, and kinder to the 
environment. The researchers also found that the reasons for these preferences were primarily 
rooted in moral and aesthetic principles that understand <natural> as a near universal good. Testa 
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and Harris (2005) interject that this positive attitude towards <natural> happens despite the fact 
that “there is no reason to prefer the natural per se, as natural per se is within itself morally 
neutral. Some people are naturally healthy and happy, and this is good, yet it is equally natural to 
be unhealthy and unhappy” (p. 180). The impossible desire for a distinct semantic ownership of 
<natural> persists, and its meaning inspires discussions across a wide variety of topics. Being 
one of few places where naturalness is explicitly defined, bodybuilding is placed on the front 
lines of determining what is and is not <natural>, especially in relation to the human body. This 
is an especially ripe ground to attempt to answer one of the culminating questions of debates 
surrounding <natural>: What is <natural> and unnatural, and does either designation constitute a 
moral argument for or against it? For this reason, I look to bodybuilding in this study as an 
exemplar and springboard toward grasping the potentials of a formalized <natural>, one that 
attempts to come closer to answering this question. 
Incarnations of Natural within Bodybuilding Subculture 
To understand the breadth of the ways constructions of <natural> can escape contexts to 
have a larger impact in other areas, it is first important to understand how <natural> can come to 
operate in a formalized way. One place this frequently occurs is in the subculture of 
bodybuilding. <Natural> exists as a less ambiguous type of threshold when it comes to weight 
lifting and muscle-centric sports. A lifter is <natural>, or natty, until they are not. Once he/she 
leaves this designation he/she often cannot return to it. The moment this identity of natty is 
shrugged off is often the same moment when the athlete pricks him/herself to inject his/her first 
dose of testosterone or other anabolic-androgenic steroid (AAS). This begins a lifter’s first 
“cycle” or regimen of various substances that accelerate the muscle building and recovery 
process. These substances were once referred to as “juice” and now primarily as “gear.”  
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This moment is also, from a phenomenological standpoint, an intensely complicated one. 
Though the threshold of <natural> is forever passed, it does not, for these lifters, always 
symbolize a moment of loss. To an openly geared lifter, this moment is about moving to a 
different realm of competition with oneself and others. The transition allows the body to surpass 
the constrictions of genetic destiny. As insinuated in the examples provided in the outset of this 
study, prize money, awards, and venues for recognition are all greater for geared athletes that 
achieve bigger, more muscular physiques. This is because of the enormous revenue associated 
with the untested division of the professional level of bodybuilding.  
The $250,000 Phil Heath earned from winning his third Mr. Olympia was certainly a 
significant monetary achievement. However, it is only possible because of the much more 
lucrative business that arises from the popularity of professional bodybuilding. Sports 
supplement companies use professional bodybuilders and physique models to attract customers 
into what has become an $83 billion industry (“Sports nutrition,” 2008). New product lines are 
launched daily, and have fostered intense competition between products and brands. The 
popularity and success of a sport supplementation product is dependent on consumer belief that 
ingredients will have performance-enhancing and muscle-growing effects.  
When professional bodybuilders appear on the labels of these supplements, or endorse 
them in advertisements, they send a message that connects the athlete to the product. Since these 
professional bodybuilders are not subjected to any drug testing, a public is left with an 
insinuation that these athletes have achieved their physiques through the use of the <natural> 
products they are marketing. Though it seems illogical to believe that these results can be 
achieved “naturally,” a general lack of understanding about the science involved in nutritional 
supplementation makes it difficult to unequivocally reject the products. When this reasonable 
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doubt is coupled with a desire for bodily improvement, it is easy to connect the athlete’s success 
to the product if even in a small capacity.  
This presumption works to the advantage of supplement sellers. Sports supplements only 
have to prove to the FDA that they are safe for human consumption, and will not cause a positive 
drug test, in order to make the shelves. The products sport scientific-sounding and intriguing 
names like “P6 Black: Androgenic Nootropic Matrix” and “N.O. Explode: The Pre-Workout 
Igniter.” Such products often do not need to authentically demonstrate that they perform any 
significant muscle-building benefits, and companies are largely permitted to conduct their own 
lab tests for effectiveness. For this reason, producers only need to inspire a belief that the product 
could work if used correctly. The active ingredient in any of these supplements will almost 
always prove to be marketing success.  
These products are especially appealing to those who have not crossed the threshold of 
gearing referred to earlier. Those individuals who do not want to deal with the potential effects 
of AAS, human growth hormone (HGH), or other drugs may turn to supplementation as a safer 
and legal way to try to increase their lean body mass, trim fat, and bulk up (Black, 2013). 
Supplementation allows athletes to maintain their <natural> status both in the ways they view 
themselves and externally in regard to the rules of their respective sports. This is an especially 
important factor in drug-tested amateur and professional sports, and reserves a lofty place for 
athletes within a plane of moral high ground that our culture’s adoration of <natural> creates.  
Even holding knowledge about the limited effectiveness of the products I’ve described, I 
confess I have spent a considerable amount of my restricted income on supplements that I know 
are unproven to work. The desire to achieve quicker gains in strength and muscle mass is 
alluring even if it exists primarily in myth. I remember being excited for the debut of the acid-
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green “Iron” series from MusclePharm brand for the sole reason that it was the first supplement 
line ever endorsed by bodybuilding legend, Arnold Schwarzenegger. I have spent $40 dollars on 
a small tub of “Resurrect PM” powder primarily because record 8-time Mr. Olympia Ronnie 
Coleman was flexing on the label, and I have snickered to myself when I’m in a store with 
someone who checks out with something I have decided is only a box of nonsense. At these 
moments I force myself to ignore that a majority of my purchases were because the product was 
on sale.  
In making my buying choices, I perceive an opportunity to gain an advantage of growth 
for a discount. This is in spite of the fact that clearance prices are generally another sign that the 
product does not work. The allure of the athlete selling his/her results as <natural> is often too 
much to resist for athletes who are unsatisfied with their current results or for the beginner 
looking for an easy fix to an extended period of sedentary behavior. The buyer essentially hopes 
to buy AAS in a form that does not legally count as AAS, does not require needles, and does not 
affect any inward or outward perception of self. The ideographic power of <natural> embedded 
within a muscle-building product inspires hope that a legal, safe, magic pill or powder exists that 
can take an unassuming physique and craft it into the most aesthetically pleasing body in the 
gym. This is often enough to try just one more product. The ideal is to be both perfectly 
proportioned, perfectly symmetrical, and somehow remain perfectly <natural>. Sports 
supplements claim to hold the possibility of gaining advantage without any forfeiture of moral 
superiority.  
Competitions that involve testing have unique and very particular guidelines toward 
determining whether a competitor is <natural>. These rules, though they appear differently 
amongst factions, challenge the ambiguity embedded within the ideographic <natural>. 
16 
	
Bodybuilding first regulates <natural> by creating separate divisions for tested and untested 
competition. Tested competition essentially determines the naturalness or unnaturalness of a 
body. Until this determination is made, a competitor assumes the benefits of <natural> status 
regardless of an appearance that might suggest otherwise. These competitors effectively “pass” 
for <natural>. Competitors are deemed unnatural when they become caught in one of many 
specific requirements that the governing bodies of the sport offer. These requirements come in 
the form of long lists of banned substances such as: stimulants including ephedrine or cocaine; 
narcotic analgesics such as methadone and morphine (but codeine is okay); evidence of anabolic 
agents such as clotestbol or a testosterone count greater than a six to one ratio (unless for a 
medical condition); diuretics such as mersalyl and mannitol; HGH; blood doping; and many 
other substances and practices. Blood and urine tests can also be administered every 60 days that 
an athlete remains in the professional circuit (“Banned substances,” 2008).   
The striations natural bodybuilding offers have divergent effects. The regulations 
supposedly provide a working definition of what <natural> means for built bodies by positing 
themselves as “clean, pure, and innocent,” the antithesis of the chemically-enhanced. The 
definition is only enforced in one niche of the sport and even here the definition changes between 
the sports’ governing bodies. Within the natural bodybuilding world, different definitional 
requirements and testing procedures create a further “moral hierarchy of difference” (Garratt, 
2014, p. 2). This makes the concept of natural proliferated by the sport “not nearly as pure or 
complete as it seems” (p. 2). For example, the Natural Physique Association (NPA) operates 
under a “lifetime natural” policy and adheres to the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (WADA) 
standards of testing. This includes a full-spectrum urinalysis for banned substances, including 
recreational drugs, which is processed at the WADA laboratories in London. NPA also uses 
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rigorous polygraphic and forensic testing (in the form of a 90 minute, $600 athlete-pay exam) 
that has an accuracy rate above 98%.  
Despite these rigorous standards, rival division British National Bodybuilding Federation 
(BNBF) claims moral superiority due to the fact that they test competitors both during qualifying 
competitions and after events. Of course, the NPA retorts that these tests are not WADA certified 
like the type they conduct, and are thus less reliable. They also point out that BNBF is only 
concerned with a competitor’s last seven years of natural/unnatural behavior (Garratt, 2014, p. 
2). These arguments are further complicated by the fact that most natural bodybuilding 
organizations do not have the budget to consistently test competitors up to the standards laid out 
in their protocols. 
The pretense surrounding the argument about whose <natural> is most morally superior 
is largely defunct for one primary reason: There exists no test anywhere that can fully validate 
claims to lifetime naturalness by any standard. Therefore, divisions who claim a more realistic 
standard for determining naturalness have, in a strange way, a more accurate assessment of who 
within their competitions is, at the moment, a natural competitor. Thus they are able to more 
consistently judge a status of <natural>. Even so, even this more narrowed claim remains 
inconsistent and shaky. It is the business of those creating masking agents to be ahead of current 
testing procedures. Likewise, testing facilities can only search and detect the presence of 
substances known to exist, and can only punish for those currently banned. At best, claims of 
distinctions between <natural> and unnatural within these divisions align far more closely to 
claims that they are presently unable to prove incidence of disallowed substances.  
Where debates rage over what constitutes a <natural> body on the tested side of the sport, 
the untested side thrives off of the ambiguity they are afforded by not attempting to regulate 
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natural at all. Unbridled by constraints, testing procedures, suspicion, and infighting, 
corporations and (to a lesser extent) untested athletes reap the financial benefits of the deniability 
that the tested division creates in its regulatory practices.  
Impact on Bodybuilding Subculture 
In less regulated locations, definitions of a bodily <natural> play out quite differently. 
Even so, the seeming importance of natural/unnatural status remains. In the training rooms where 
muscular bodies are molded, questions of naturalness arise as bodies compare themselves to 
other bodies. Here, people with different commitments to <natural> practices interact without 
any clear designation of who fits where. Those who are less muscular often critique the larger 
lifters, and justify their own bodies by accusing the other of being unnatural. The assumption is 
that anyone could achieve that level of result if he/she were willing to make the moral 
concessions that this person apparently has elected. This critique is rarely done in front of those 
being “accused” for reasons relating to fear of bodily harm, inability to substantiate accusations, 
and lack of consequence for any evidence that proves someone’s “unnatural” body.  
Though there is certainly no formal testing done in this space, distinctions develop. I 
recall asking training partners if they think “that big guy has been geared for a while” while 
admiring (or ‘miring in bodybuilding circles) what I regard as the big guy’s aesthetically superior 
physique. If we agree he is a longtime user, I no longer feel as much shame when he lifts more 
than I am able to or if he has a more sculpted core. Though (in most cases) these individuals 
likely do not care what I think of them, the practice of making these distinctions is an interesting 
one. This is especially salient if we consider <natural>’s function as an ideograph. Why, as a 
cultural collective, should we feel the need to determine who and what is <natural>? What does 
it mean when we reassure our own bodies as permissible by painting another body as not (or 
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less) <natural>? Such questions are immensely consequential, but perhaps not so easily 
answered.  
<Natural>, as an ideograph, remains both imminent and illusive even despite attempts to 
tie it down. Though the way we have positioned <natural> as it relates to humanity makes it 
theoretically impossible, we still encourage and enforce naturalness between human bodies and 
on human action. When we corral the ideograph to mark which bodies are <natural> and which 
are not, we engage a deeply problematic potential. Likewise, leaving the ideograph without any 
formal regulation might also create potentials for harm. Thus, regulation of <natural> has proven 
to be a difficult practice with a long and sometimes unfortunate history in U.S. America.  
In this dissertation, I intend to specifically discuss the ways U.S. Americans formally 
striate the ideograph of <natural>. I also plan to explicate the consequences and potentials of this 
course of action. The following is a description of the chapters to follow. 
Preview of Chapters 
In Chapter Two I will examine the historical deployment of <natural>. First, I canvass 
attempts to formally and/or legally constrain <natural>, and I discuss some of the motivating 
force behind these actions. I trace these instances of formal naturalness as they move from 
describing objects and towards living organisms. This progression culminates in a discussion of 
how purposed, direct depictions of <natural> have been used to stratify and harm bodies, and 
how bodybuilding has historically been directly involved in this process. 
In Chapter Three I weave a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) smooth and 
striated spaces into a consideration of steroids in bodybuilding, and further, to striated bodies in 
general. Here, I make a turn through the abstraction offered by Deleuze and Guattari toward a 
specific, active site of constructions of <natural> and unnatural. Through this discussion I outline 
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a philosophical/rhetorical approach toward recovering the unnatural body in ways that are often 
missed. I approach this, in part, by bringing into question our cultural insistence on striating 
<natural>. Here I discuss inquiries into how our collective interactions with the ideographic 
<natural> might be altered such that we see unnatural as not inherently shameful or morally 
inferior, but productive and necessary. This chapter functions to create the argument that says: If 
we center instead the <natural> body within the theo-critical gaze and understand the processes 
that go into striating what is and is not <natural>, we might break our culturally embedded 
assumptions of <natural> as idealized form, and productively alter our collective appreciation for 
and employment of <natural>. 
In Chapter Four, I center the discussion of bodies on an applied investigation into 
alternative considerations of <natural> and unnatural bodies. Here, I apply the turn I offer in 
Chapter Three by beginning a direct challenge to the ingrained assumptions of, and formalized 
references to, “natural” superiority. I do this through contextual explanations of what a less 
bodily violent <natural> might look like in given scenarios. I first bring into question our 
methods of knowing and recognizing <natural> within any given context. I especially focus on 
the place of natural law within broader discussions of morality. I then parallel this discussion 
with my applied metaphor of “unnaturally” built bodies. I argue that within a given setting, an 
“unnatural” body can become the transgressive body that we ought to strive to become rather 
than a fearful specter we attempt to formally exorcise. I contend that these unnatural bodies are 
bodies that might be read differently, expand notions of the possible, and challenge institutional 
stagnation. Thus they are the bodies necessary for any type of real becoming [in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1987) use of the term]. I briefly incorporate some existing conceptual offerings such 
as Haraway’s (1991) cyborg as ways we can envision productive blending and blurring of the 
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illusionary natural/unnatural dichotomy. I investigate how our transgression of formalized 
naturalness destabilizes many of our problematic normative conceptions about bodies. It is my 
intention to substantiate alternate ways of understanding how we can productively valorize the 
unnatural body as resistance to a mythic, morally superior <natural>. This chapter represents my 
attempt to theoretically rebuild <natural> through both new and existing vocabularies. 
In my final chapter, I offer concluding remarks to unify my argument and provide an 
advisement on how to approach the formal stratification of ideographs in the future. I interpret 
Coonfield’s (2006) “machinic” approach to understanding the uses and potentials of objects and 
concepts to ideographs. Here I explain why I believe neither a full dismissal of a formalized 
<natural>, nor a clear definitional agreement on what <natural> is, provides the most hopeful 
trajectory. I outline an approach that requires a different philosophic attitude toward <natural> as 
well as more flexible and contextual decision and policy-making methodologies. I close by 
offering a minor example and explanation of this approach in action.  
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CHAPTER II 
 HISTORY OF A CAPTURED <NATURAL> 
Introduction 
As shown in Chapter 1, <natural> is one of the most influential symbolic placeholders 
within the English language. As an ideograph, <natural> carries a unique and powerful directive 
force, especially when focused toward a specific communicative goal. Its combined ambiguity 
and widely held aura of moral superiority makes <natural> a prime instrument in persuasive 
arenas. There currently exist no universally accepted statutory or regulatory definitions of 
“natural” that easily traverse codes of definition, regulation, or law. This lack of regulation 
allows for widespread employment of a term that has been shown to be especially influential.  
For this reason, both courts and governing agencies have long been forced to improvise 
in order to settle disputes regarding the heavy term. This improvisation comes to primarily rely 
on situational applications of an “I’ll know it when I see it” approach (Fraley, 2014, p.1). This 
leads to an ever-evolving, largely unsatisfactory benchmark for what <natural> “is” that is 
largely lodged in temporal cultural convention and convenience. In U.S. America and many 
other Western settings, this convention often means defining nature by setting it dichotomously 
against humans and their interventions or against particular humans or human actions. This type 
of distinction carries numerous consequences where rulings are determined by exacting 
interpretations of the ideograph. In the following sections of this chapter, I canvass the legal 
history of <natural> and cite exemplars of rulings involving regulatory definitions of <natural>. I 
order these subsections as I do to showcase the increasing danger of a defined <natural> as it 
more closely approaches human bodies. I then move this history into conversation with that of 
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the <natural> within bodybuilding. It is my intent to showcase the interrelated use and 
development of the ideographic <natural> within these contexts. 
Applications in Patent Law  
One of the most consistent consequences of separating the human from the <natural> 
involves patent law disputes. Disagreements in this realm concern designations of “natural” that 
can sink the patentability of a product or process. Section 101 of the Patent Act states: “Whoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition… may 
obtain a patent therefore…” (Patent Law, 1952). However, though this language has been 
interpreted broadly, it excludes “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from 
being considered for patent coverage (Diamond v. Diehr, 1981). This provision exists so that the 
forces that govern all scientific advancement and behavior cannot be owned by any single entity. 
For instance, there will be no patent given on the forces of gravity. However, the lines are often 
not this easy to draw. Thus courts have advised caution with such restrictions saying, “too broad 
of an interpretation… could eviscerate patent law as all inventions at some level embody, use, 
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature…” (Mayo Collaborative v. Prometheus Labs, 2012). 
There will always be a part of the <natural> world contained in any product or process that 
occurs within a world confined by laws of nature. The difficulty, then, is creating a consistent 
surgical point where humanness can be detached from naturalness enough to forfeit ownership of 
a phenomenon. As eluded to earlier, this divide has proven to be immensely philosophically 
complicated. Understandably, patent courts have been quite slow to make this cut in a consistent 
way, though there have been efforts. 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office has attempted in the past to make a type 
of surgical divide that would offer further reaching guidance. Under existing advices, a natural 
24 
	
thing is to be understood as “the handiwork of nature” that “occurs without the hand of man 
[sic]” (Fraley, 2014). However, since there are certainly no processes that have had zero 
interaction with humankind before they arrive at the patent office, this advisement still must 
function as a sort of partitioned spectrum. On one end, there is minimal human intervention; on 
the other, a product or process that could not possibly happen without willful human interference 
(Fraley, 2014). The patent office must still decide at which point on this range lies a patentable 
idea. This decision process becomes a negotiation of how much deliberate human interference is 
enough to claim something as “unnatural.”  
At the same time, the patent applied for must not too closely approach that which is 
regarded as human essence either, else it can become natural once again. Though human breath 
is entirely a product of human action, a patent court could not rightly allow a patent on human 
respiratory function. Devices used for breathing are likely, however to receive a patent. Similarly 
the human process of sleep is not patentable, but a whole range of products, processes, and 
interventions associated with sleep are granted sole ownership rights. This is all to say that any 
divide between the human and the <natural> cannot be expected to remain clean and distinct. 
There is a flow between humanity and natural-ness that does not easily lend itself to definite 
decision-making: to be apart from humanity is to be considered <natural>, to be within or innate 
of human is also largely considered <natural>, but the result of the conscious action of a human 
is much more difficult to legally classify.   
The purpose behind particular distinctions can be seen in differences between individual 
court rulings. In Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. (1948), the Court ruled that offering 
a new mixture of bacteria to apply to seeds (making them healthier and more prolific) was not 
protectable by patent since it was considered only a discovery of an already natural process. This 
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process, it was ruled, could have occurred in existing conditions without purposed human 
intervention. However, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) the Court ruled that a genetically 
engineered bacterium used to break down crude oil could be patentable since the bacteria were 
not “naturally occurring” and were the result of human engineering. The result of these rulings, 
and many others like them, create a murky backdrop for understanding what is and is not 
<natural>. It seems that even a living creature can be considered unnatural and thus patentable if 
the utility of the associated innovation has been strongly established. <Natural> thus can easily 
become entwined in definitions of convenience and capitalist perpetuity.  
Such patent cases showcase at least two relevant points for this study:  
1. Distinctions in and amongst the ambiguity of <natural> must often be drawn to favor one 
party over another since prior advisements are, at best, only situationally applicable and 
they too likely once functioned to advantage only one side.  
2. Once a product (or even a living organism) is deemed unnatural, it is not only 
unprotected as its own entity, but it is permitted to be exclusively owned. As these 
distinctions draw closer in proximity to bodies, the stakes are raised and the differences 
become cloudier. 
Applications Concerning Wildlife 
 Continued concern for a legal human/nature divide is evident in rulings concerning 
protection of certain animal species. Perhaps the best examples of this are the provisions located 
within The Endangered Species Act. These provisions forfeit protection for animals not living in 
their “natural” habitat, that is, those who have been geographically moved by humans. This is 
true even if the species is offered protection in what is considered their “home location.” 
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Relocated animals are considered “experimental” populations and thus not worthy of the same 
type of conservation efforts. Examples of these experimental populations would include even the 
re-introduction of formally “native” species such as the Mexican gray wolf in New Mexico and 
Arizona, and the California Condor in the Grand Canyon region. This vocabulary highlights how 
even a single act of human interference/intervention can affect the <natural> status of a creature, 
and permanently disqualify it from protection protocols.  
 Policy-related definitions of natural wilderness areas are similarly affected by their level 
of human interaction. The Wilderness Act of 1964 defines wilderness as “undeveloped” and 
“retaining its primeval character…without permanent improvements for human habitation.” It 
exists to preserve areas “where the earth and its community…are untrammeled by man [sic], 
where man [sic]…is a visitor who does not remain.” The act also gives power to the office of the 
Secretary of Agriculture to actively determine which areas are suitable wilderness sites. These 
sites are meant to be areas that are roadless for at least 5,000 contiguous acres.  
Proximity to humans and their traveling patterns forfeit a region’s eligibility for 
consideration of protection. In fact, it is the primary determining factor in the <natural> worth of 
a particular region. According to Jamison Colburn (2007), the way we preserve what we consider 
to be natural now “bears only a passing relation to biodiversity and habitat protection,” and 
serves primarily as a way of combating any blurring of the human/nature dichotomy (p. 38). 
From these policy stances we can glean that, legally speaking, human (synthetic) interference in 
the processes of wilderness discredits and (apparently unredeemably) devalues this wilderness to 
the point where it no longer deserves association with the term. <Natural> status in these cases is 
defined, valued, polluted, and then devalued all by way of human action. In real ways, the 
designation of <natural> goes far in determining what lives and dies. 
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Succinctly, humans have the legal capacity to make certain species of animals, and even 
certain plots of land, unnatural. This is significant in that it showcases the ways definitions of 
<natural> are controlled on both ends by human action. This revelation would inspire little belief 
in the actuality of any type of pre-existing <natural> that can offer significant moral guidance 
(even though <natural> is widely cast in this role). Perhaps it is useful to retrace the winding trail 
of logical thought that provides us with this widely accepted conclusion: 
a. Nature is often constructed as that which humans decide to be adequately inhuman or 
at least free of significant human interference.  
b. When this demarcated nature comes into significant contact with humanity, it may 
very well lose its claim on naturalness. 
c. Despite this forfeiture, this “new” creation is not afforded the protections of humans.  
Close connection between the human and <natural> seemingly creates something that is fully 
neither. This is a conceptual parameter that I will explain more thoroughly later.   
Applications in Food Regulation 
 As was established in Chapter One, the term <natural> carries a profound market value in 
the food industry. This is largely derived from the moral and health-related superiority that U.S. 
American audiences still attribute to the term. Products labeled “100% natural” are widely 
considered to be the best options when available. The next closest label that inspires goodwill 
toward a product is similar: “all natural ingredients.” Though Western culture seems to desire a 
<natural> that is outwardly and obviously distinct from humanity, we also expect our interior 
being, our flesh, to be fueled and begot of the <natural>. For such reasons, <natural> foods are in 
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especially high demand insofar as they can hold claim to the designation. This terminology has 
also proven to be quite difficult to regulate.  
 In 1982, the Food Safety and Inspection Service ushered in the first modern guidance 
system for food labeling as it relates to natural-ness. The guideline specified that anything that 
contained ingredients that were “artificial or synthetic” should be considered unnatural. The 
FDA also interpreted the distinction through an informal policy offered in 1991. This defined 
natural food products as those in which “nothing artificial or synthetic (including colors 
regardless of source) is included in, or has been added to, the product that would not normally be 
expected to be there” (Negowetti, 2012, n.p.).  
Unfortunately for those attempting to apply either of these guidelines, no additional 
advisement was supplied to clarify definitions of “artificial” or “synthetic.” The FDA considered 
outlining a more formal definition that would define natural in both the food and cosmetic fields, 
but decided against it. The primary reason for this change, of course, is that the agency realized 
there was no simple definition that would satisfy all cases, and that nearly any food or cosmetic 
product is “processed” in one way or another ("What is the meaning of 'natural' on the label of 
food?", n.d.). The only sufficient advisement would involve a high number of specific 
requirements that would need to be adjusted for context and updated over time. It was 
determined to be far simpler to allow individual decisions to be made independently. A number 
of cases have involved commercial competitors who dispute one another’s specific marketing 
claims. Recent battles have revolved around uses of particular ingredients such as high fructose 
corn syrup and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) (Goulet, 2012). 
Multiple court cases have requested that the FDA intervene and create a type of formal 
statute for “natural” and “all natural,” but to date they have refused to do so. In 2008, the FDA 
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formally announced that they would leave “natural” undefined in their guidelines and that they 
had no plans to ever introduce regulation on the term. This has left a number of cases pending, 
unlikely to be resolved absent the power of regulatory intervention. It has also led to a large 
number of out-of-court settlements, plaintiff dismissals, and concerned customers.   
For example, in November 2012, a Colorado woman sued the Pepperidge farmers, 
makers of many popular snack products, in relation to their line of “Naturally Made” Goldfish 
Brand crackers. This was done after she claimed they were “using inappropriate and misleading 
labeling” on their product by calling it “natural.” These crackers are made from flour, oil, milk, 
salt, and not much else. The cheddar variety used in the product is “baked with real cheese” and 
contains no artificial preservatives (Watson, 2011). As far as mass produced snack products go, 
this was arguably one of the more benign options on the market shelves. The problem, the 
woman said, is that the snack did not fully qualify as “natural” because it contained at least traces 
of genetically modified soybeans.  
Also, in the summer of 2012, lawyers sued General Mills over the contents of its Nature 
Valley granola bars, claiming that “Nature” was not indicative of the contents of the food and the 
advertising surrounding the “goodness” of the snack was misleading. In the same year, plaintiffs 
targeted the GMOs in Kashi breakfast cereals that advertise with the phrase “Seven whole grains 
on a mission.” Targeted as well have been the genetically modified “all-natural corn” in Kix. 
ConAgra recently dealt with a round of accusations for making “dubious claims of ‘natural’ on 
four varieties of Wesson cooking oil, all of which derive from genetically modified crops” 
(Trauth, 2013, n.p.). Naked, a brand claiming to produce “all natural juice products,” has 
similarly experienced accusations of GMOs appearing in their recipes.  
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The abundance of these cases, and the inability to consistently resolve them, further 
highlights the ideographic qualities of <natural>. It also demonstrates the socio-cultural and 
political power afforded to the ideograph. <Natural> status is something U.S. Americans desire 
and praise; however, it is also an abstract commitment that they feel a cultural prerogative to 
protect and purify. Westerners want what they eat to be <natural>, and in turn express a rooted 
desire to remain themselves biologically (understood largely as inwardly) <natural>. What is 
<natural> impossibly becomes both that which we want within us, away from us, but also only 
that which is not in close enough proximity to us that either party is corrupted. Humans and 
nature have become both co-constitutive and co-destructive. Therefore, the supposedly separate 
entities have a social and legal prerogative not to infect one another less they risk becoming 
culturally devalued or morally unacceptable. This inclination to cleanse what is <natural>, both 
from humanity and internally within populations of people, has incited multiple instances of 
violence towards particular bodies. 
Historical Human Violence of a Captured <Natural> 
 <Natural>, though heavily guarded, is widely observed as a term with positive 
connotation. However, the formal distinctions I have highlighted have shown that <natural>’s 
existence is predicated on the theoretical exclusion of things deemed unnatural by authoritative 
voices or supposed majority opinion. Though these distinctions certainly can be argued to have 
shown productive results on occasion, there are times when these same distinctions are 
inherently harmful. The greatest harm occurs when the “items” that are distinguished between 
are bodies. Distinctions of <natural> have led to many indefensible practices, and among these 
are some of U.S. America’s biggest judicial atrocities. I detail these examples as historical proof 
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of the ways this country has systematically employed <natural> to privilege, segregate, 
physically relocate, and execute bodies. 
 The Indian Removal Act of 1830 was the incredibly perverse result of a preference of one 
construction of <natural> over another. Under constitutional law, native tribes were to have 
sovereignty over all aspects of government save "the single exception of that imposed by 
irresistible power” which referred to foreign diplomacy with European governments. Chief 
Justice John Marshall named these privileges “original natural rights” in the Supreme Court case 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (“Native American Rights,” 2008). Instead of operating from this 
construction, the Indian Removal Act relied more closely on an outdated precedent that 
understood “natural” citizens to be “All persons born in the United States with the exceptions of 
children of foreign ambassadors, Indians, and, in general, people of color.” (“Native American 
Rights,” 2008, p. 3).  
The definition of <natural> chosen by the court meant that Native American bodies were 
not legally considered <natural>. (This is an especially hypocritical and ironic determination 
considering the comparative geographic heritage of the people involved.) Since these peoples 
were deemed legally unnatural, they were no longer protected under constitutional provision. 
Thus, they could be forcibly removed from their homelands. President Andrew Jackson justified 
this by saying the action  
will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; enable them 
to pursue happiness in their own way and under their own rude institutions; will retard 
the progress of decay, which is lessening their numbers, and perhaps cause them 
gradually, under the protection of the government and through the influences of good 
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counsels, to cast off their savage habits and become an interesting, civilized, and 
Christian community. (Chandler, 2011 p. 155).  
This decision played into the deaths of at least 6,000 Cherokee on the Trail of Tears. By 
choosing this legal precedent to operate under, the Supreme Court decision enforced a definition 
of <natural> not based on any consensus of historical meaning, but instead on a convenient 
translation begat from the utility of the decision for a particular group: powerful, land owning 
Whites. In doing so, both the Court and the executive branch showcased the violent power of the 
ideograph regulated in relation to humans. (For a more thorough deconstruction of the Indian 
Removal Act, see Black, 2009; Cave, 2003).  
Citizenship rights for Native Americans were dealt with again and further solidified in 
the case of Elk v. Wilkins (1884), which denied John Elk the right to vote in the state of 
Nebraska. The Court held tightly to the precedent that citizenship was established solely by the 
federal government, not the states, and that Native Americans were not included in the 
guarantees of citizenship. This meant these people were not extended the right to vote by the 
Fifteenth Amendment. The Court emphasized that the rulings of Congress did not ever intend for 
such rights to be established for Native (somehow unnatural) persons. The precedent set in Elk 
would stand until 1887, when Congress approved the Dawes General Allotment Act, which 
granted citizenship to Native Americans on the condition that they disavow tribal affiliation and 
allegiance (Washburn, 1975). It wasn’t for another three years that Native American men were 
extended the full right to vote through the Indian Naturalization Act of 1890. 
 The same logic that was used against native peoples in 1830 played out similarly in the 
Dred Scott Decision in 1857. Chief Justice Robert B. Taney ruled that the U.S. Constitution 
permitted the unrestricted ownership of black slaves by white U.S. citizens. In a 7–2 decision, 
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the Court declared that slaves and emancipated Blacks could not be full U.S. citizens. Full rights 
were reserved only for those considered natural citizens: a definition that was still limited only 
to Whites born within the United States. The decision’s wording clearly demarcates the place of 
the Negro within early 18th century U.S. America, saying:  
The alien is excluded because, being born in a foreign country, he cannot 
be a member of the community until he is naturalized. But why are the 
African race, born in the State, not permitted to share in one of the highest 
duties of the citizen? The answer is obvious; he is not, by the institutions 
and laws of the State, numbered among its people. He forms no part of the 
sovereignty of the State, and is not therefore called on to uphold and 
defend it. (“Dred Scott vs. Sandford,” 2008) 
Because of this ruling, slavery was not only allowed to persist in Southern states, but the decision 
insinuated that it should be allowed in all U.S. American territories. This regressed abolitionist 
movements by several years. The residue of the legal distinction between the <natural> bodies of 
White folks and the “unnatural” bodies of color is still felt in the legacy of racism in U.S. 
America. (For more see Fehrenbacher, 1981; Graber, 1997; Luna, 1998.) 
 Even after the overturning of this legal precedent by way of the Naturalization Act of 
1870, the U.S. American judicial system continued to actively define which peoples within the 
nation’s borders were <natural> and which were not afforded this privilege. The specific 
guidelines of the 1870 Act give "aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent" the 
ability to become naturalized citizens of the United States. On the surface this decision appears 
to be one of inclusiveness toward a population long treated as legally inferior. Unfortunately, it 
was not so altruistic. The language of the Act continued to exclude Asians and Native Americans 
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from citizenship along with any other non-whites of non-African lineage. Moreover, the law 
became symbolically taxing and, in effect, provided a target for violence against Blacks as their 
claims to legal citizenship were increasingly trumped by social and political subordination and 
physical backlash. 
 Twelve years later, Congress addressed Asian citizenship directly in the Chinese 
Exclusion Act. This was a United States federal law signed by President Chester A. Arthur on 
May 6, 1882, that became one of the most significant and long-lasting restrictions on free 
immigration in U.S. history. Following the end of the California gold rush and Civil War, 
Chinese workers became the targets of significant racial animus from working class whites in 
Western states. Despite the fact that Chinese immigrants and their children comprised less than 1 
percent of the U.S. population, Congress felt they must intervene to assuage racial fears that 
Asians were “stealing” jobs from white U.S. Americans (Gyory, 1998). Under this act, Chinese 
immigration was restricted, and in many cases, entirely outlawed. People of direct Asian heritage 
were disallowed legal naturalization, and their very presence was considered suspicious. Fear of 
persecution forced Asian ethnic groups to cluster within poorer metropolitan areas, especially 
San Francisco. Non-White immigrants and their families became a visual construction of the 
body that did not belong, the unnatural(ized) body.   
 The Exclusion Act was renewed in 1892 and then ruled permanent in 1902. The Act 
gained significant legal traction and formed the basis for other race-based exclusion measures 
including successful efforts to deny naturalization to Hindus, Japanese, most Middle Easterners, 
and East Indians.	It also made possible Executive Order 9066 issued February 19, 1942.  In this 
order President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the deportation and incarceration of “anyone” 
under the authority of regional military commanders. This power was used to declare that all 
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people of Japanese ancestry were disallowed from inhabiting the West Coast of the United 
States. This included all of California and much of Oregon, Washington, and Arizona. The only 
exception was for those interned in government camps (Korematsu v. United States, 1944).  
Approximately 5,000 Japanese Americans relocated outside the exclusion zone (Heine, 
Harihara, & Niiya, 2002), and 5,500 community leaders that had been arrested after Pearl Harbor 
remained in custody (About the Incarceration, 2014). The majority of mainland Japanese 
Americans were evacuated (or, more accurately, forcibly relocated) from their West Coast homes 
during the spring of 1942. In total, somewhere between 110,000 and 120,000 Japanese people 
were detained, 30,000 of which were school-aged children (James, 1987). Across the 10 
internment camps, nearly 2,000 deaths were recorded, primarily from diseases traceable to sub-
par living conditions. Many families suffered total forfeiture of any and all possessions they 
could not carry on their person. 
In 1943 the Magnuson Act was passed, which finally nullified the 1882 Chinese Exclusion 
Act. This paved the way for Chinese immigration to the U.S., at a still severely tempered rate of 
105 individuals per year. This Act was not based in altruism either, but rather as a response to the 
wartime efforts of Japan to portray the U.S. as a racist and imperialist threat to all of Asia. It was 
also an attempt to appease China, and help foster a trans-Pacific alliance with an emerging power 
(Ngai, 2004). The Magnuson Act also allowed many formally restricted ethnicities to finally 
apply for the naturalization they had been long denied. 
Legacy of Natural 
In the previous sections I detailed how a variety of U.S. American legal systems have 
approached designations of <natural> in the past. I explained how patent law operates under 
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definitions of <natural> that appear to be largely based on utility	and profitability. I also 
highlighted how our legal protection for the <natural> world is dependent on imperfect 
definitional standards that enable humans to “denaturalize” nature toward possibly harmful 
consequence. I then discussed the history concerning the ways this nation has legally constructed 
the naturalness of bodies. From the totality of this data there appears to be at least one consistent 
theme: The process of formalizing <natural> operates along a predictable pattern.  Governmental 
authority withholds designations of <natural> (or changes current designations) in order to 
insulate a particular dominant group or ideology. The power of an ideographic <natural> is able 
to be drawn upon by only a select few. 
Eventually, cultural or environmental pressures accumulate to the point where definitions 
must be altered. This necessary change operates as a double-edged sword. Though broadening 
the definition of who can be natural(ized) appears to be a move towards equality, the concurrent 
move suggests otherwise. The terminology of <natural> is rarely (if ever) dissolved. Rather, it is 
only being moved. In this movement, <natural> becomes more inclusive for some, but further 
distances those who it does not accept within its parameters. The distinction remains, and with it 
the advantages or disadvantages of attributed status. Individuals and groups would not require 
access to a legal status of <natural> if it did not carry a necessary advantage, or in other realms, 
they would not flee from it if it didn’t still carry negative connotation. Even in the process of 
inclusion, <natural> continues to cast negatively-read difference elsewhere.  
Clearly, even with the overall positive regard <natural> yet claims, deployment by 
operationalizing the ideograph can be supremely dangerous. <Natural> has a legal history 
steeped in violent use as a justification for mistreatment and enforced supremacy. It is important 
to understand that <natural> becomes most perilous when its ambiguous, ideographical standing 
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is harnessed and thus undermined by enforceable definition. Normally, an ideograph’s power 
exists in its fluidity. Any ideograph can mean many things and be attached to many things, but is 
never intended to refer to any specific set of things. When it is effectively tied to a particular, 
recognizable definition, ideographs should theoretically lose their latent ubiquitous power. 
History surrounding <natural> suggests this is not the case. Even through instances of regulation, 
<natural> has maintained its weighty influence.  
Any time a body is considered unnatural within a culture that treats <natural> as an 
admirable ideograph, the potential exists that this body will be disciplined or harmed for its 
deviation. This potential is compounded when <natural> carries both the force of law and the 
ideological/moral gravity of an ideograph. This type of conflict is illustrated now in legislative 
debates concerning things such as immigration policy and LGBTQ rights. In both cases, 
lawmakers and pundits call forth a discriminating <natural> in an effort to push to the center 
particular viewpoints by pushing to the margins the needs and desires of other groups. The power 
of a directed <natural> is both pervasive, imminent, and possibly dangerous. Thus it is important 
to investigate the constitutive power of the word wherever it arises as a dividing force. I turn now 
to an examination of the specific history of bodybuilding in an attempt to demonstrate how 
<natural> can progress from unused term, to ideal form, to a “necessary” label used to 
distinguish between bodies. 
History of Bodybuilding and <Natural> 
Bodybuilding and associated activities have long held unique influence over the ways 
particular bodies come to be recognized. In this section, I begin to trace bodybuilding’s history 
(primarily men’s bodybuilding) as it relates to Western appreciation for the aesthetic and 
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<natural> male body. To properly give a history of bodybuilding as sport and practice, it is first 
important to define what it is that bodybuilding describes.  
In its most common treatment, the term bodybuilding can be used to cover a wide 
spectrum of activities. These range from the individual gymnasium workout using weights all the 
way to the professional competitions sponsored by national and international federations (Dutton 
& Laura, 1989). One widely accepted way to define bodybuilding is as the use of 
weight/resistance training in order to improve muscularity (in size or tone). This definition can 
be used to distinguish the practice from weight bearing sports like powerlifting or Olympic 
lifting that are more concerned with effective strength and technical ability to move weight 
(especially as it relates to the person’s size). This definition would also then mark bodybuilding 
as distinct from practices that use weights to improve performance in other sport (e.g., like a 
football player lifting weights to become more explosive on the field, or a way of rehabilitating 
muscles after injury). 
Though this type of definition might most accurately describe what bodybuilding 
effectively is on its own, the deployment of this definition would rule out the majority of people 
who employ the activity’s tenets. Many people who do indeed use weight training to increase 
muscularity would reject bodybuilder as a term that applies directly to them, much as I did in my 
introduction. Most folks are more likely to describe their activity as “doing weight training,” 
“working out,” or “trying to get/stay fit.” This is done in much the same way as a person who 
occasionally plays pick-up basketball is reluctant to call themselves a “basketball player” or an 
individual who tinkers with their car might not readily self-identify as a “mechanic.”  
The threshold of activity frequency seems to be much higher for weight trainers than it 
might be for the basketball hobbyist or mechanical enthusiast, however. If a person played 
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basketball or worked on their car for three hours a day, five days a week, and also constructed 
their diet, sleep pattern, and activity level around conditioning their body for the activity, it 
becomes significantly more likely that this person would self-identify as a basketball player, 
mechanic, or any other specialist. The difference then seems to be that people who describe what 
they do as “only weight training” are not necessarily training for a particular contest of any sort. 
Even someone who is only training to increase musculature will still often refrain from accepting 
the title of “bodybuilder.” Dutton and Laura (1989) suggest that this reluctance can be traced to 
two primary roots:  
1. The individual does not want to accept any social stigma associated with 
bodybuilding. 
2. The individual believes the term bodybuilding is more properly restricted to 
competition bodybuilding and its technical requirements and judging criteria. 
I would add to this a third qualifier that, combined with suggestion two, describes my own 
reasons for not accepting the title of bodybuilder:  
3. The individual does not view his/her progress and/or development as up to the 
standard of someone rightfully considered a bodybuilder.  
Although bodybuilding is more rightly understood as a process than an achievement, there is a 
certain assumption of accomplishment that accompanies the designation. Often this 
accomplishment can be measured through direct competition. 
Organized competition seems to be the largest (at least perceived) difference between 
those who do only bodybuilding training activities, and the widely held understandings of 
bodybuilding as a distinct practice. In the dominant usage of the terminology, those who actively 
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compete in bodybuilding competitions are the truest bodybuilders; those who do not weight train 
at all, and have no desire that relates to increased muscularity are certainly not. Between these 
two poles exists a spectrum of activities that is more or less bodybuilding. For example, someone 
who trains rigorously for competition, has not yet entered an event, but intends to join is a 
bodybuilder to some and not others, but would likely self-identify as one. Similar is the case of 
the person who made a career of bodybuilding but no longer actively competes or even trains. I 
would place myself below both of these individuals on a theoretical spectrum because, although I 
desire increased musculature and weight train to achieve this result, I do not currently have any 
intention of competing.  
This spectrum of definitional “bodybuilding” resembles the type of ambiguity that 
<natural> has shown throughout its formal history. Despite the loose adaptations of the term we 
are likely to encounter in its discussion, I believe it is still possible to discuss a history of 
bodybuilding, as well as its interrelation of ideographic <natural>, as a recognizable set. For the 
purpose of this study, I look to a history of bodybuilding as defined through its interest in the 
public aesthetics of the muscular body as achieved by means of methodical training. In the 
following section I describe some of the historical conditions that brought Western culture to 
arrive at this practice, and I highlight the historical moments and periods where the cultural 
significance of the practice has fluctuated and propelled us towards current understandings. I 
begin this description with a discussion of one of the first historically significant names in 
“modern” male bodybuilding, Eugen Sandow. 
Eugen Sandow and Early Modern Aesthetic Muscularity: Recreating the <Natural> Body 
 The appreciation of the display of aesthetic muscular form in the Western tradition dates 
at least as far back as the ancient Greeks. These were a people who strongly believed in the 
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human body’s capability to reflect the ideal beauty of the gods. Compared to men, gods were 
long depicted in works of art as more powerful and more perfectly proportioned. The gods 
showcased their supreme energy in their stature, strength, and muscularity. This symbolically 
represented a distinction between the two types of beings, but (as do many myths) allowed for 
the possibility of direct physical interaction between men and gods. Much like the story of 
Hercules, humans retained the ability to achieve similar status to gods through training and deed. 
As athletic competition gained popularity throughout the Greek empire, sculptures of the gods 
began to depict a transcendent human potential for strength and robustness. To become better 
built—to emulate the gods—was to become more perfect. Ancient influences persist in readily 
recognizable ways. For example, the pose of the subject in Michelangelo’s “The Athlete” is still 
the inspiration for one of bodybuilding’s competition poses. Arnold Schwarzenegger, during his 
dominant run in competitive bodybuilding throughout the 1970’s and early 1980’s, was said to 
have finally brought flesh to what artists could once only imagine.   
Most historians of modern bodybuilding point to Eugen Sandow as the pivotal figure in 
the popularization of aesthetic muscularity in the industrial age and beyond. This is largely 
because he continues to be remembered as the first recognizable bodybuilder. This recognition 
is, of course, largely attributable to intuitive assessment and lack of holistic historical scope for 
this era, but it is not without merit. Sandow first gained recognition in 1889 by winning 
England’s “World’s Strongest Man” competition. Following the win, Sandow toured 
internationally throughout England, Australia, South Africa, and Continental Europe. At first, the 
majority of his touring duties were similar to the already-established circus strongman act. He 
would bend iron pokers, wrestle animals, and lift large objects as spectacle. He did, however, 
offer one significant addition the traditional routine: he would enter a glass booth with music 
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accompaniment and perform a series of poses that highlighted his muscular frame. This part of 
the routine impressed then unknown promoter Florenz Ziegfeld so much that he signed Sandow 
to a ten-week contract to perform at the Chicago World’s Fair and then a new four-year contract 
directly afterwards. The attraction was so successful that Ziegfeld was able to pocket upwards of 
$250,000 in the short span in which they worked together (Dutton & Laura, 1989). 
 The significance of Sandow’s new attraction was that he was no longer being promoted 
as the world’s strongest man, but instead as the world’s best-built man. This departure is 
noteworthy because it marked the first modern instance of endeared muscularity for 
muscularity’s sake. It was not the function of the large body that impressed audiences; it was the 
allure of a superior/awe-inspiring human physique. The invention of the photograph and the 
timing of its increased popularity also proved to be an important factor in the growth of muscular 
aesthetics. In a time before advanced photo editing technology, this art form was progressive, but 
limited in how it was only able to capture people as they were. For bodies to have a similar 
impact to the classical depictions in paintings and illustrations, the body must look like a 
sculpture. Sandow was one of the first to popularize the human image of a classical idealized 
form. 
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Figure 1. Eugen Sandow. (Sandow, 1907) 
On the heels of Sandow’s popularity, many others began to try to find ways to emulate 
him and his success. This included both attempts at stage careers and also those who built bodies 
for display in other types of venues. In some cases, the growth was simply attempted for use in 
everyday life. Later in his life, Sandow was able to turn his popularity into a successful business 
career as an instructor and a promoter of muscle and fitness events. The new types of activities 
that Sandow popularized gained a substantial following and piqued interest across myriad 
venues. Eventually, his practices and those of his discipleship were in the public eye enough that 
they began to require their own terminologies.  
Though his physique remains legendary and in many ways innovative, the practice that 
Eugen Sandow and his contemporaries were especially adept at was uninhibiting and making 
public a type of behavior that has arguably always existed. Dutton and Laura (1989) refer to this 
practice as the fundamental human trait of “natural interest in the look of the human body” (p. 
29, emphasis added). In their description, humans have always been interested in how we look in 
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one capacity or another. This is true whether it relates to primal genetic/reproductive favoritism, 
or culturally-related class indicators. Over time, we have found ways and reasons to culturally or 
religiously stigmatize the practice of looking too closely. We have even gone as far as 
diagnosing the practice as scopophilia, or the questionable exercise of obtaining pleasure by 
looking at bodies. The history of art and fashion can be used as simple evidences for the 
argument that this behavior exists broadly, as can the way body images have been effectively 
tied to self-esteem. During this first era of bodybuilding, however, training the body was best 
understood as the science of perfection. 
The Perfectible <Natural> Body 
 Using Sandow, his students, and his peers as guides, the late 19th and early 20th century 
saw an uptick in bodybuilding enthusiasts, also known as physical culturists. These innovators 
and their followers began work on ways to most effectively promote and create the bodies that 
had become such a popular viewing attraction. This was undertaken as most things were in this 
time period: as a product of expert knowledge to be captured in scientific method. A great 
number of “textbooks” became available for purchase with titles indicative of the way the body 
was being recognized: The Science & Art of Physical Development (Pope, 1902), Treloar's 
Science of Muscular Development: A Text Book of Physical Training (Treloar, 1904),The 
Construction and Reconstruction of the Human Body: A Manual of the Therapeutics of Exercise 
(Sandow, 1907), and MacFadden's Encyclopedia of Physical Culture: Volume 5 (MacFadden, 
1912). 
 This turn of the century scene was a world that might seem odd to many of us now, 
especially those tied to bodybuilding activity. In this age, bodybuilders and muscle men were 
“teachers” and “professors” who taught courses in “physical culture” in gyms, known as 
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“colleges,” “schools,” and “institutes.” An instructor’s credibility was found through the 
development of their own body and later the bodies of their students. Sandow was even bestowed 
with the title “Professor of Scientific Culture to the King” (George V) in 1911 (Scott, 2008).  
Beyond being the distributors of bodily knowledge, bodybuilders also became especially 
useful as living models of anatomy. The maximum visibility of their musculature made easier 
lessons within the context of medical school and human anatomy/physiology courses. These 
bodies were not understood as markedly unusual or strange, but rather as useful enlargements of 
the <natural>. Through scientifically understood practices geared at hypertrophy and body-fat 
reduction, their bodies were exactly what they were supposed to be. They were the magnified 
truth of human physique which was easier to observe and understand. Essentially, they were 
bodies “enlarged to show texture” much like the images on the front of a cereal box. From this 
realm of perception, bodybuilders/physical culturists were not unnatural at all; rather they were 
<natural> more fully performed and easier perceived. 
 This is not to say there was a lack of hierarchies for physiques in this era. In fact, the 
standards of greater perfection we relatively laid out. The perfectly built body was one that 
profiled as “rationally developed,” “efficient,” and “well formed.” This is strikingly similar to 
the ways a high-end industrial product might be described in this same time period. At the other 
end of the hierarchy was the “unhealthy,” “malfunctioning,” or “misshapen” body (Liokaftos, 
2012). This type of physical frame began to be understood as the product of inadequate attention 
and poor process. The discourses of the time did not categorically separate these types of bodies 
as pass/fail, however. Rather, both types of bodies existed on the same continuum of normality in 
a way that mirrored the ancients’ perception of gods and humans. Likewise, these variations of 
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body size, shape, and tone were understood to lie on the same plane. They just demonstrated 
different points of arrival.  
Thus, bodybuilding came to be understood as the scientific/technological advancement 
that allowed bodies a process with which to traverse the hierarchy and become more “normal” in 
function, or otherwise stated, more <natural>. Bodybuilding was both a practice and a science in 
the minds of this era. Those who aligned themselves with this viewpoint rejected the biological 
body (its genetics and current state) as the sole organizing principle that decided what should 
occur. Bodybuilding was “the terrain and the vehicle for agency and change” when it came to 
deciding the “nature” of the human body (Liokaftos, 2012, p. 75). Succinctly, bodybuilding was 
not understood as an attempt to defy nature or a <natural> body, but rather as a way to more 
fully (and more excellently) resemble a <natural> human form. This form became understood as 
what humans should be, or at least should aspire to be. There existed both current and historical 
models for this achievement in art and literature, and a science-endorsed outline on how it could 
be achieved. The <natural> body of the industrial age became one that closely resembled the 
classical body from art history. This, of course, was not a coincidence.  
The newly industrialized West created the perfect backdrop for this philosophy that 
venerated the built classical body for several reasons. First, as I have already shown, the 
modernist tone of the day held a great appreciation for any process that could be standardized, 
scrutinized, improved, and taught. Bodybuilding functions as an activity of strict process and 
progression and, at the time, it offered improvement for the most fundamental unit of competing 
nations: the population. Bodybuilding allowed for enhancement in outside perception both on the 
level of form (aesthetics) and function (health/vitality). This same methodical process also 
offered a second parallel goal of bodybuilding and modernity: championing nature. By ignoring 
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the formerly assumed constraints of the human body in favor of technological improvement, 
those involved with bodybuilding did not attempt to defy nature as we might call it now, but 
instead to bend it to humanity’s will as a resource. By understanding bodily progress as a product 
of scientific control, Western industrial-age philosophies easily assimilated bodybuilding tenets 
in the same vein as they would understand building dams or digging canals. This was another 
way for “man” to redirect nature toward his purposes. 
There were indeed many ways bodybuilding ideals were in sync with the ideals of the 
turn of the century. However, the third, and perhaps most pervasive, reason for bodybuilding’s 
sudden influence in the industrialized West was because of the ways bodybuilding openly 
opposed behaviors associated with this “new” modern way of life. Physical culturists of this time 
strategically included iconography and vocabulary that were steeped in anti-modern rhetoric (it 
should be again noted bodybuilding itself is at least a partial product of modernity) (Liokaftos, 
2012). In doing so, physical culturists were able to prey on the dissonance of those 
unaccustomed to the type of lifestyles now available. Weak, sickly, and “malformed” bodies 
were understood as “an expression of ‘unnatural’ urban/industrial environments” (Liokaftos, 
2012, p.78).  
Thus the practices of bodybuilding were a way to return to the roots of humanity that 
were believed to exist more correctly during the Classical Age. Classical art, and the bodies that 
resembled it, were used to imagine a more “idealized ‘natural’ equilibrium” (Liokaftos, 2012, 
p.78) that better transitioned bodies that worked (in the physical/scientific sense) toward bodies 
that operate machines to do work. The classical body was understood as “a concrete embodiment 
of an apparently transcendental standard of perfection and harmony” (p. 78). Much as there was 
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understood to be a most efficient way to work and a most proper way to solve a problem, there 
was assumed to be a given ideal of bodily stature that was, quite literally, set in stone.  
 
Figure 2. Michelangelo’s Victory. (Michelangelo, 1532) 
The highest aspiration for those aligning with the physical culturists was to “attempt to 
restore the transcendental aesthetic of ‘natural order and form’” (Bailey, 1998, p. 39). The early 
bodybuilding community sold the pursuit of health, beauty, and strength as a type of citizen duty; 
what Bailey (1998) refers to as “rational recreation” (p. 39). To choose not to make your body 
more <natural> through bodybuilding was to risk being caught up in a language of individual 
irresponsibility and shame. Thus influential books, such as the well-known How to Pose (Saldo, 
1914), created a lingering image of the body that, in its <natural>/ideal state, was the end result 
of a process of education and cultivation of a person’s body and mind. Popular titles spoke of the 
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perfect body in terms of its ability to imagine, contemplate, concentrate, and then create 
perfection—imagery remarkably similar to a sculptor with an unshaped block. This perspective 
offered a view of humanity whose current undisturbed, unworked bodily state (what we might 
call a <natural> state now) was utterly unnatural. It was only through strenuous and continued 
work that a person might produce (or more accurately in modern terminology, mechanically 
reproduce) the perfect <natural> body. From this perspective, the stone was always meant to be 
cut, and there was a correct way to do it.  
This type of guidance marked bodybuilding’s first foray into formally (though still 
vaguely) determining which bodies were and were not <natural>. The building of the body was 
recognized as a <natural> remedy to industrial ills both in its goal (restoring the body to what it 
should be) and in its methods. As a consequence, creating the built body involved engaging in 
<natural> behaviors like “being exposed to the elements, natural therapy, avoidance of drugs and 
alcohol,” and in every way possible mimicking the <natural> behavior of the human animal (e.g. 
running, feats of strength) (Wedemeyer, 1994, p. 28). In tandem, these methods were designed to 
combat and cure the degenerative effects of modern civilization. It was also seen as a more 
<natural> way of achieving health and balance than the medical orthodoxy of the day. 
Bodybuilding practices were sometimes prescribed as treatment for ailments such as “weak 
constitution,” constipation, stress, headaches, lethargy, and insomnia. Building the body meant 
achieving a more respectable balance in a world of rapid change.  
Alternatively, bodybuilding advocates surprisingly had no tolerance for excess, artifice, 
extravagance, or generally overdoing it. Though the image we have of bodybuilders now 
involves men and women who have pushed themselves to the maximum possible size and 
musculature and beyond, the “best built” bodies of the early 20th century looked quite different. 
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“Balance” and “grace” were essential elements of the ideal body (Treloar, 1904). All-around 
development was privileged over size of particular muscle groups (unlike the massive arms, 
chest, and thighs required now). Bodybuilding laid claim to an elevation of human form that 
most closely approached what was culturally viewed as the <natural> order of life. Overly 
developed bodies were relegated to the realm of the “grotesque, disproportionate, and unnatural 
bodies of strongmen” (Lambropoulos, 1989, p. 77).  
These unsightly body frames denoted a type of class designation that was reserved for 
unleveled specialists or even the circus side-shows which bodybuilding first worked to 
distinguish itself against. By contrast, bodybuilders/physical culturists remained harmonious, 
educated, balanced, and offered an air of upper-class distinction, even if it was only in 
appearance (Lambropoulos, 1989). Even the desk jockey or pencil pusher could work themselves 
into “the body they were meant to have.” Ideally this type of body would also appear <natural> 
and at ease as if they were not overtly trying to express their superior figure. Instead these people 
were expected to carry it as if it were always meant to be there. Such was the description of top 
bodybuilder Otto Arco who boasted the “cut of a heroic statue, and at the same time an elegant 
line of grace and movement” (Calvert, 1925).  
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Figure 3. Otto Nowosielsky (Arco). (Calvert, 1925) 
This early era of bodybuilding becomes especially important to this study for two primary 
reasons.  
1. The era demonstrates direct historical precedence for the categorization of bodies through 
the use of an ideographic <natural>.  
2. This era shows the propensity of bodybuilding to intervene in and influence dominant 
dialogue about all bodies, especially in relation to <natural>ness.  
 This second reason deserves further explanation. Although only certain bodies practice 
bodybuilding directly and even fewer might classify what they do as bodybuilding, all other 
bodies are in some ways implicated whenever a standard emerges and moves. During this era, 
bodybuilding both created and extended its influence by creating a public forum for built bodies, 
by standardizing the ideal body, and by generating a scientific method of achieving this body. By 
the early 1920s, nearly all of U.S. America and Western Europe incurred extended exposure to 
the tangible results of the growing physical culturist/bodybuilding movement. Because of this 
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new type of intense bodily awareness, witnesses could not be considered casual observers to 
these built bodies anymore. They were forced to locate themselves within an aesthetic/<natural> 
vs. malformed/unnatural hierarchy and adjust their behavior accordingly (or not). Both of these 
factors would continue to play significant roles in the next major era of bodybuilding even as 
definitions over what should constitute this <natural> form became less unanimous.  
Muscle as “American Manhood” or “Muscle for Its Own Sake”: Bodybuilding’s Middle 
Era 
The time between the 1940s and 1970s saw a number of organizational and philosophical 
changes in the physical culturist/bodybuilding movement. National and international structures 
for bodybuilding competition were formed, and new governing bodies began to dictate their 
specific rules and parameters. In the post-World War II era, the global shift left the United States 
to take over from a rebuilding Western Europe as the center of the world’s bodybuilding stage. 
This period also saw the rupturing of the physical culturist movement into factions working to 
promote their own interpretations of the definition and purposes of bodybuilding and the 
ideal/<natural> body. The most prominent example of this fissure can be found between the two 
major bodybuilding contests held during this time. These were the Mr. America contest, which 
was sponsored by the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) and the Mr. Olympia contest sponsored by 
the International Federation of Body Builders (IFBB).  
In this section, I will use these two entities to briefly outline the ideological battleground 
that bodybuilding created and participated in during this time. I will narrow my focus to an 
examination of how differing ideas about bodybuilding and pursuits of the aesthetic body had a 
significant impact on understanding what comprised culturally acceptable, and <natural>, 
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behavior. It is my belief that this middle era provides further evidence both of the ideographic 
power of <natural> and the influential ability to categorize that is held by bodybuilding.  
The AAU and “A Champion America Can Be Proud of” 
 The Mr. America contest was first formed by the AAU in 1939 and had a lasting run time 
of nearly 60 years (Liokaftos, 2012). Like its physical culturist predecessors, this group 
maintained a focus of all-around development, still distrusting excess. In many ways, the contest 
operated as an answer to the popular “Miss America” pageant which debuted in 1929.  The 
stated goal of the “Miss” pageant now is to “provide young women with a vehicle to further their 
personal and professional goals and instill a spirit of community service through a variety of 
unique nationwide community-based programs,” (Participate and Earn Scholarships, 2014). 
However, at its inception this contest represented an attempt to locate perfect specimens of 
womanhood, specifically in the realm of conventional feminine beauty. Similarly (and also 
purposefully contradictory), Mr. America sought to showcase the “ideal representation of 
American manhood” in every aspect possible (Liokaftos, 2012, p. 106). This involved making 
judgments about physicality, morality, and even the mentality of contestants. Aesthetic 
muscularity was still the most judged attribute in determining a Mr. America. However, the 
physical appearance was intentionally understood more as a byproduct or a derivative of larger 
commitments more suitable for the model U.S. American youth. A good and well-balanced body 
was marketed as the <natural> result of a lifestyle focused on the rugged strength, health, and 
patriotic character befitting a citizen of post-war superpower. Much of this involved intentional 
ignorance toward the lifestyle and commitments required to win the event. 
 By 1955, the standards for determining a winner continued to progress towards “more 
balance” in the competitors’ qualifications. The AAU’s organizational fear of an appearance of 
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too intense a focus on the aesthetic appearance of men’s bodies seems to have been enough 
motivation to seek countermeasures. Searching for the “ideal representative” now meant sifting 
through additional criteria like “character, education, career aspirations, and athletic ability” 
(Fair, 1999 p. 17). The procedures for determining the winner also moved beyond simple stage 
posing and included an interview process and an assessment of the functional strength of the 
competitors denoted by adequate performance in the Olympic weightlifting events.  
Interestingly, a criterion of “general appearance” was instituted as well. Instead of turning 
the focus away from the body of the competitors, this contest requirement turned tighter scrutiny 
on the “heterosexually coded surfaces of the body” (Liokaftos, 2012). In 1957, the head of the 
AAU committee on weightlifting and bodybuilding, Bob Hoffmann, outlined the relative 
importance of these new standards in an interview found in Strength & Health Magazine: 
[T]here should be an endeavor to select the best all-around man, a man who will 
be a credit to the title he bears… The following system of scoring is employed: 5 
points for Symmetry of Proportions, 5 Points for Muscular Development, 5 points 
for General Appearance, Skin, Hair, Posture, etc., and 5 points for Athletic Ability 
(Fair, 1999). 
Hoffman went on to further outline the requirements of “General Appearance” saying that the 
contestant should have impressive teeth, posture, and carriage on the platform. He must also be a 
“good-looking man” in a “handsome, manly sort of way” (p. 65) He was also to be devoid of 
features like “buck teeth, small chin, lined face, irregular skin, shortage of hair, bald spots, 
varicose veins, stretch marks, and flat feet” (p. 66) The contestant was also to be a “wholesome 
type of man” with high moral standing, well-educated, alert, and friendly. Above all, Hoffman 
stipulated that we should be “proud to call him Mr. America” (p. 66). 
55 
	
 As the list of descriptors grew, a clearer sketch of the perfect U.S. American began to 
grow. Instead of merely reflecting the prevailing attributes of the times, the continued 
adjustments of the Mr. America contest became an active contributor to the definition of the 
perfect, pure, or <natural> state U.S. American men should display. Also, the AAU continued to 
push forward the philosophy that these standards of perfection should be achieved “naturally,” or 
at least, without obvious, obsessive effort, As one of the original bodybuilding judges, Bernarr 
Macfadden was especially vocal about this standard, saying, “all development should be natural” 
and that bodies should become a manifestation of ”what nature intended for the proportions of 
the body” to be achieved through the normal rigors of life (Fair, 1999, p. 23). As increasing 
importance was placed on factors beyond the classically sculpted bodies of competitors. Those 
who claimed bodybuilding as their exclusive practice started to gain an unsavory reputation as 
wasteful and vain. Bodybuilders were increasingly understood as those with “nothing better to do 
with his time than spend four to five hours a day in a smelly gym doing bench presses and curls” 
and who “wears his hair long and gilds the lily by having it waved” (Fair, 1999, p.169).  
 The behavior of this “cult” of bodybuilders was a violation of the traditional, upright 
masculinity that formed much the foundation of post-war heteronormativity. Over obsession with 
“look” over strength, function, and ability was unmanly, improper, and unnatural (Liokaftos, 
2012). Thus, the Mr. America contest took up the duty of creating and upholding a model of pure 
Americanism. This included creating safeguards against the contest being only a “male beauty 
pageant.” Oddly, a bodybuilding contest became a foremost contributor to the notion that 
pursuing muscular development for its own sake was peculiar and more so, a type of unnatural 
gender dysfunction. 
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 In some ways, the contest’s popularity and requirements belied its own commitments to 
their idealized modes of exceptionalism and heteronormativity. Though they claimed an aversion 
to obsession with appearance, the contest’s parameters created a standard and showcase for the 
most conventionally attractive men of the nation. Sculpted bodies paired with intense 
requirements for “general appearance” garnered appeal beyond supposedly rugged, 
heteronormative, manly coding, and effectively encouraged behavior the organization 
supposedly abhorred. Though highlighting athleticism and facial features was cited as an attempt 
to avoid sexualization of the aesthetic male body, these attempts largely failed. In fact, as 
bodybuilding contests gained more regional and local traction, so did so-called “blue” or 
“beefcake” magazines that extolled the nearly flawless figures, faces, and features of the most 
recent champions. Such “undue preoccupation” with male aesthetics was supposedly relegated to 
place of “degenerate” and “lesser” masculinity (Hooven, 1995). Lowest on the continuum of 
masculine behavior was the ever widespread fear of the infiltration of homosexuality. Though 
“muscle magazines” proliferated the standards of <natural> U.S. American perfection, these 
publications also actively contributed to the sexualizing of the male form, despite their supposed 
efforts otherwise. Bodybuilding circuits and publications also served as a device for promoting 
some types of sexual services and networks (Hooven, 1995). By attempting to standardize an 
image of the ideal American, Mr. America created a display of “ultimate naturalness,” and 
simultaneously provided an avenue of expression for behaviors and even lifestyles the forming 
organization would long name as “unnatural.”  
The IFBB and “Muscle for Its Own Sake” 
	 In 1965, a new and differently-oriented contest emerged that challenged the landscape 
and inherent purpose of bodybuilding. The IFBB and its co-founder, “trainer of champions” Joe 
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Weider, announced Mr. Olympia as a method of breaking bodybuilding out of an age of 
sideshow and quiet embarrassment and into a self-celebrating age. Weider wanted to push the 
limits of human potential, and remove restrictions that encouraged only moderate growth. Unlike 
Mr. America, that could only be entered once, Mr. Olympia was designed as a “contest of 
champions.” It intended to attract those who had devoted a lifetime to developing their physiques 
and, through competition, the organization incentivized further growth. According to a statement 
in a 1965 issue of Muscle Builder Magazine, the competition committee for Mr. Olympia wanted 
“to see just how far they can go… how big muscles can be built. We must establish a contest for 
the greats – and through this contest the greatest of the greats can emerge” (Weider, 1965, p. 3). 
 Mr. Olympia marked the first major investment in and showcase for “pure bodybuilding.” 
The IFBB considered their organization to be the representative of the pinnacle of self-
determination. They viewed bodybuilding as an underserved collective of inspired individuals 
who had been repressed for too long by rules that turned some of the world’s best athletes into 
either a sideshow or an afterthought. For the first time, building muscle for the sake of building 
muscle was a practice that could be openly celebrated. Behaviors that Mr. America had long 
called irresponsible, wasteful, and unnatural, now had a type of “international brotherhood” 
(Fair, 1999, p. 21) where they were welcomed, encouraged, and promoted. 
 Though the premises of Mr. Olympia were especially resonant with those already 
entrenched within a sub-culture of bodybuilding, constructing bodybuilding as a <natural>, 
acceptable practice to the remainder of society proved to be a challenge. At the time of the 
contest’s inception, the AAU was an especially powerful sports program, and offered the highest 
level of exposure for those involved in competitions related to bodily aesthetics. The AAU also 
required their athletes to maintain amateur status. Those who claimed membership within IFBB 
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(a professional organization) were effectively weeded out of mainstream exposure. To attempt to 
gain credibility for the professional bodybuilding movement, the IFBB and its members had to, 
in essence, re-define a subset of <natural> masculinity (Fair, 1999). This meant confronting the 
primary point of disagreement between the two organizations: ability vs appearance, or “surface 
vs. substance” (Liokaftos, 2012). 
As discussed prior, the portrait of ideal/<natural> manhood during bodybuilding’s 
“middle period” both reflected and influenced bodybuilding standards. The Mr. America contest 
did much to showcase and promote an aesthetic ideal of “rugged, functional manhood” that 
could be seen manifest though strength, functional fitness, proportion, character, and facial 
attractiveness. The IFBB ushered in a contrasting definition of masculinity that offered pursuit of 
aesthetic muscularity as “a legitimate index in itself for a sense of male selfhood” (Liokaftos, 
2012, p. 119). To spread this perception, bodybuilders aggressively attacked any perception that 
bodybuilding for its own sake was problematically narcissistic, and thus a failure of manhood. 
Many times this was accomplished through a “they’re just jealous” rhetoric encapsulated in this 
article taken from a 1967 publication of Muscle Builder Magazine: 
Every muscleman eventually hears the stinging remark: “you’re just a mirror 
athlete… and I got a friend half your size that can lift twice as much.” Well 
brother, that hurts… and when it comes from other weight men who are more 
knowledgeable… it hurts twice as much… Of course we know anyone who 
derides bodybuilding does it out of pure jealousy. [They] secretly crave a 
handsome physique, but haven’t got the ambition to work for it… Only the 
bodybuilder exhibits perfect muscular development and a high degree of strength 
too. (Liokaftos, 2012, p. 120)  
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Through this commentary, we see how bodybuilders did not always attempt to abolish 
established indexes of masculinity, but chose to show how a built body could be viewed 
as in alignment with the seemingly more <natural> values like hard work, strength, and 
dedication.  
Another approach used by bodybuilders to alter public perception of their activity was the 
perpetuation of an aura of “hipness” and intrigue that surrounded the bodybuilding lifestyle. 
Bodybuilders appeared self-assured in their profession, lifestyle, and in their bodies in a way that 
showcased an attractive confidence. Their seemingly counter-cultural sentiments and distaste of 
traditional bodily expectations were in alignment with the uneasy social climate in the U.S. 
American 1960s. The practice of becoming something better through hard work and self-
advancement was also easily consumed by those who leaned towards notions of liberal 
individualism (Eagleton, 1990). By claiming their practices to be a demonstration of “pure 
bodybuilding” and “the crowning of personal achievement,” while simultaneously advocating for 
broader definitions of appropriate personal pursuits, the IFBB and its athletes offered a product 
with elements that both social conservatives and radicals could latch on to, even if it could not be 
appreciated fully by either. 
 This middle era of bodybuilding is important to this investigation in a number of ways. 
The primary point to recognize is how the era illustrates the interwoven essence of <natural> and 
bodybuilding between the 1930s and 1970s. This is shown both through the ways bodybuilding 
deployed <natural> in order to discipline the actions of its contingency, and also by the way 
bodybuilding (as a distinct practice) attempted to defend itself from outside scrutiny. In this era, 
unlike the early era that preceded it, bodybuilding’s assertions on what the <natural> body 
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should be appear to be was equally matched by societal pressure pushing back against what 
society perceived to be excessive within bodybuilding.  
The two largest divisions of bodybuilding can be seen to take contesting approaches to 
assertions of unnaturalness. The AAU and the Mr. America contest curbed its emphasis on 
aesthetic bodily features toward more widely accepted, <natural>, performances of masculinity. 
The elite bodybuilder, under this definition, must rely on physical imperatives of morality, 
complete development, strength, and attributable skill. They were beholden to “post-war gender 
politics that aligned physical culture with patriotism and proper citizenship” (Liokaftos, 2012, p. 
132). The winners were supposed masculine role models for U.S. America’s male youth. This, of 
course, casted an unnatural, “unmanly” Other that “ranged from the ‘narcissistic’ and the ‘weak’ 
to the ‘perverse’ and the ‘queer’” (Liokaftos, 2012, p. 132). The division essentially attempted to 
defend itself against fears of unnaturalness by delineating and casting out that which it thought 
unsavory. The AAU “pruned away” the unnatural in hopes that what was left would still fit 
within, and also continue to define, what is <natural>.    
The newly formed IFBB with its Mr. Olympia contest took a quite different approach and 
eventually came to prevail. The leadership and its members defended what they did as “pure” 
and also an acceptable outcropping of traditional virtues of masculinity. Instead of shunning 
practices that focused overtly on aesthetics, IFBB bodybuilders produced the built male body as 
both an object of desire and as a superior achiever. In their depiction, taking care of oneself 
(including looks) was “a legitimate index of masculinity” (Liokaftos, 2012, p. 132). The duty of 
“rational recreation to achieve the natural” that was depicted during bodybuilding’s early era was 
progressively drawn into a paradigm of potentiality and continual development (Hoberman, 
2005, p. 45). This focus would generally last into the most recent era of bodybuilding (which I 
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detail more fully in the next chapter) and continues to operate within a landscape of bodily 
naturalness that has become ever more formalized. 
Conclusion: Formations of <Natural> Bodies 
 In this chapter I outlined and intertwined historical precedents of <natural> across a 
series of venues. Both within the realms of historical legality and inside organized bodybuilding, 
<natural> has been given way to cast its ideographic weight through methods that make (often 
problematic) distinctions between items, creatures, and human bodies. The practices and 
decisions outlined in this chapter create a backdrop that denotes both the power and 
pervasiveness of <natural> especially as it approaches segregation of human bodies. In the 
following chapter I will couple this historical account of <natural> with more recent 
manifestations of the term and explanations of what <natural> is now doing. Here, I have shown 
how an ideographic natural has taken concrete, enforceable form or has “crystallized.” Next, I 
will describe the theoretical process of the ongoing crystallization of <natural> and use this 
theoretical model to discuss the consequences related to the hardening or “striating” of 
ideographs more generally. In order to make sense of the process of ideographic crystallization, 
this study will turn to the vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari to explain what is conceptually 
accomplished when philosophically loaded terms such as <natural> begin to take recognizable, 
consequential forms. I intend to use this analysis to point to the impact of practices that enforce 
concrete meaning on ideographs, both specifically in bodybuilding and well beyond, and also to 
highlight methods of resistance towards associated undesirable effects.  
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CHAPTER III 
SMOOTH AND STRIATED SPACES 
Introduction 
 As illustrated by the brushes with conflict outlined in the previous chapter, 
determinations of <natural> are far from simple matters. When a decision is made in relation to 
the definition of <natural>, consequences will likely arise that reach beyond the realm where the 
debate first appeared. In my investigation thus far, I have shown that there seems to be a 
collective search for and appreciation of <natural> in and outside of bodybuilding. However, 
evidence suggests that the fluidity of the term itself makes far-reaching delineations complicated, 
if not impossible. I have also displayed the functions of <natural> as an ideograph in U.S. 
American culture and how it has enjoyed widespread usage in political rhetoric. If <natural> can 
be both ideographical and deployed as a definable term, the potential certainly exists for the 
rhetorical weight of the term to enact discriminatory action against those bodies that do not fit 
within a conventional construction of <natural>. 
 As historical examples have shown, this discriminatory action, when carried to high 
levels of legislation, can be extraordinarily violent. This is certainly a primary concern of any 
crystallizing <natural>. However, operating without any standardization, the ideograph can offer 
free reign over a word that still holds the benefits of an overall positive and influential 
connotation. This freedom can be argued to be a potentially productive state, but the lack of 
regulation surrounding <natural>'s relation to, for example, certain products, can create similarly 
dangerous potentials where a poorly informed population is led to use substances with harmful 
bodily consequences. If <natural> can mean anything, it can easily be manipulated to cause 
harm. This doubled-edged potential for trauma brings about a number of theoretical questions 
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relating to how to properly and judiciously approach the crystallization of ideographic <natural> 
and similar terminologies. In this chapter, I apply an existing theoretical lens to the process of 
ideographic crystallization in hopes of uncovering the potentials of this action and our collective 
responsibilities toward these terms. 
Smooth/Striated 
 The process of capturing or crystallizing an abstract space such as <natural> and then 
regulating this expanse mirrors Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) descriptions of smooth and 
striated spaces. Smooth and striated spaces are opposite, but co-constitutive, dynamic areas of 
thought, regulation, and ideals. These spaces exist because of and in spite of one another and, 
over time, serve to alter the understanding of what a practice or belief means. At the most simple 
level, a smooth space is one that is without demarcation, borders, or regulation. Deleuze and 
Guattari offer the uncharted ocean as a model example of a smooth space. Before humans were 
able to map or find locations in open water, we were forced to assume the oceans continued 
endlessly. It was an area, mass, and volume of immeasurable vastness and uninterrupted 
continuity. Human activity, outside a system of formalized economy, can also similarly be 
considered a smooth space, as it exists without the need for distinctions between tasks.  This 
distinction between smoothness and striation in human activity illustrates the difference between 
doing what is wanted and needed, and doing what is authoritatively required.  
 A striated space exists when a smooth space is captured, charted, and regulated. The 
ocean, in some respects, lost much (but never all) of its smoothness with the development of 
navigational instruments that allowed charting of a ship’s position even days from any shoreline. 
If we discuss people instead of water, it is rules, regulation, expectations, government, and 
economic forces that work to striate human activity. What would once be considered the simple 
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fluid movements of living become striated into work, play, education, etc. as these tasks become 
more or less economically valuable. Outside these delineations, human activity is 
intersubjectively flowing chaos: activities between people occur as they need to, and societies do 
not impose impermeable boundaries on themselves. In this smooth existence, activity is self-
regulating through evolving desire. Requirements are always being pushed, tested, and re-
evaluated as necessity or curiosity requires.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe human activity in this condition as a type of 
nomadic “war machine,”—a collective that resists control. Though the term appears violent 
rather than restorative, war is not the purpose of this assemblage, but rather a consequence of 
constant confrontation with an overly controlling State. The nomadic war machine can be 
thought of as a device of social organization that fosters constant creativity and actively opposes 
measures that constrict and homogenize human behaviors. The machine is thus the smooth, 
revolutionary force marching on the horizon, “bubbling up” from a shared public desire to move. 
This is the type of smooth force that opposes unjust systems of rule. Smoothness is disrupted 
whenever activities achieve recognizable value that can be partitioned and marketed. More 
organized systems of statehood work to engulf the smoothness of the action of the war machine 
and fit this action within a more prescribed system. For example, when the war machine itself 
becomes subsumed by a State, we call it a military. Instead of being a force of ever-progressing 
ideals, this newly purposed machine becomes an enforcer of political and economic aims.  
 The authors (1987) describe this process as the enactment of an “apparatus of capture.” 
An ordered state theoretically uses this apparatus to alter the meanings of activity to fit within the 
larger economic venture—to capture meaning for larger purposes. For example, through the 
apparatus once-smooth territory becomes striated land as the landowner and the prices of rent 
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foster direct comparison of plots of ground. Smooth bartered exchange becomes striated 
installments of money when taxation and the banker establish currency and determine value. 
Likewise, work is only distinguishable from other activity when it is given a name, a market 
value, and determined to be the result of surplus labor. From this point on it is understood as a 
less desirable task to undertake. As one might expect, a capitalist economy requires the extensive 
use of capture as these economies are constantly market and value driven. 
 As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) explain, however, there is never such an easy distinction 
between a smooth and striated space, nor does there exist any perfectly smooth or completely 
striated space. The two create one another even as they work to be distinct, and thus are often 
both necessary. One explanatory analogy is that of fabric being sewn. As stitches are added, the 
once-smooth space of a cloth has demarcations, sections, and inscriptions of striation. At the 
same time these stitches are added, new smooth spaces are formed between the marks that did 
not exist or at least were not noticeable prior. New smooth spaces are rendered through striation. 
Looking from the other direction, discovery of these smooth spaces also works to highlight their 
borders. The cloth was never truly a smooth space (since it was made up of its own stitches, and 
had been cut) but it did represent a type of relative smoothness in its unaltered form. Striated 
spaces are often recognized in the creation process of the smooth. 
 It is not difficult to apply Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) understanding of smooth and 
striated spaces to the complicated distinctions of <natural> that result from its regulation in 
bodybuilding. First, as the previous chapters have shown, bodybuilding is a sport largely about 
distinctions between smoothness and striation. The winning competitors are often those who 
demonstrate the most muscular visibility and separation. This is sometimes referred to in 
technical judging practices as the complexity and striation of visible muscle mass. As far as 
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competition goes, striations are almost always more suitable for winning. In applying Deleuze 
and Guattari's terminology to the ideographic crystallization of <natural> that occurs within 
bodybuilding, we are offered a chance to better examine the dynamism between smooth and 
striated spaces and the consequences of ideographic striation. 
Smooth/Striated Muscle 
 Complicated distinctions between smooth and striated naturalness, like those outlined in 
previous chapters, continue to play out in exceptionally nuanced ways across contexts. Constant 
interplay between the need/motivation to define <natural> and the likely impossibility of this 
venture is, at the theoretical level, muddy. To understand the application of smoothness and 
striation to the context of this study of naturalness, it is useful to consider a depiction of what a 
theoretical initial striation, or capture, of <natural> might look like. It requires that we imagine a 
starting location of smooth space that includes all products, people, and practices without a 
priori evaluations of their worth. The development and consequent application of a mechanism 
within the state apparatus of capture that values <natural> above unnatural in any realm of 
difference offers the first striation in this otherwise smooth space. No matter where on the 
metaphorical cloth it occurs, once this stitch is made we are now left with a grand but ambiguous 
theoretical distinction between the two planes (<natural> and unnatural thoughts, beings, and 
practices). This grand distinction offers little clarity across contexts save the presumed 
distinction arising from the semantic differential between the two opposing designations. 
However, the difference remains. Although a definition of <natural> may be meant to apply only 
in one location, the “imaginary” line of striation that divides the newly formed categories also 
divides in its assumed extension. This is metaphorically similar to how a person in New York 
might claim they live north of Arizona’s Grand Canyon. Although the landmark does not reach 
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nearly far enough east (or west) to divide New York, a relative location based on current position 
can still be assumed.    
 Because of the premise imposed by a divide, striations further offer the potential of 
violence as <natural> thoughts, beings, and practices begin to crystallize and push 
individuals/actions that do not fit within the convention of current striations towards the margins 
of society. As striations increase, divides become more recognizable. As divisions become more 
explicit, categorizations become possible. As further confrontations between <natural> and 
unnatural arise (like legal definitions of the term or regulatory action related to what <natural> 
means) the dividing lines grow more bold and become distinct. The easier it is to determine a 
person's naturalness, the simpler it is to designate their worth within an apparatus of capture. 
 When applied to our specific context of bodybuilding, striations of <natural> come in 
many forms. Striations might, in one example, look similar to the standard of <natural> that is 
supposedly forever broken when a loaded syringe is forced to penetrate skin and spill its contents 
into human tissue. Though, theoretically, there is a divide between bodies that fit this definition 
and those who do not, this striation does what all striations do: create more, smaller patches of 
smooth space where the definitions are not so distinct. For example, a substance user may be 
able to use a masking agent that circumvents testing procedures, allowing this person to remain 
technically <natural> by a particular organization's rules. Conversely, a false positive test could 
send a person who has not passed this threshold of substance usage to the realm of the unnatural. 
The primary stitch is always far from a perfect divide, and it leaves a number of practices and 
people fighting to cross a theoretical chasm even as it moves. An example from another sport 
provides a helpful illustration of this. Vitor Belfort is a former champion of Mixed Martial Arts. 
Later in his career he was known for his incredible, almost bodybuilder physique despite his 
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advanced age. At the time, Testosterone Replacement Therapy (TRT), a hormonal treatment for 
men experiencing low free testosterone levels, was legal in the division where Belfort fought, the 
Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC). After complaints from younger fighters that TRT was 
giving an unfair advantage to particular athletes, UFC banned TRT use for their fighters in 2014. 
Shortly afterward, Belfort pulled out of his Middleweight title fight, realizing his body would no 
longer be considered passable by the UFC or the Nevada State Athletic Commission (Erikson, 
2014). Without changing his behavior, Belfort was trapped by an evolving definition of 
<natural>.   
 The hope of the individual is to escape being pinned down or penned in with each new 
application for a distinction. In bodybuilding these appear in the form of questions like: Does my 
body appear <natural>? What happens if I accidentally come into contact with a banned 
substance? Or like Belfort, what if the standards shift such that previously legal substances that I 
have used are now banned? Though striations insinuate a distinct divide, they do not often 
provide partitions that promote consistent clarity, nor do they satisfactorily allow ways of 
considering the uniqueness of individual cases. Striated space is always rendered incomplete and 
not fully applicable, but within bodybuilding especially, striations abide. 
Governing Bodies 
Bodybuilding first striated <natural> in its Early Era through specific and pointed 
distinctions between what a <natural> and unnatural body should look like and be able to 
accomplish. This was a way of separating enlightened, <natural> humans from the weakness that 
was said to accompany modern living. Bodybuilding's Middle Era further striated <natural> 
behavior as it related to displays of national, gendered, and sexual identities. In doing so, the 
governing bodies of the sport attempted to draw borders around what was acceptably <natural> 
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appearance and gender performance. Today's bodybuilding world continues to striate <natural> 
in a number of ways. These striations offer interesting, challenging, and often contrasting 
depictions of the term. I believe that the way bodybuilding creates and contests definitions of 
<natural> is useful in understanding how we might act more responsibly in relation to the 
crystallization of ideographic <natural> and ideographs more generally. Perhaps the most 
impactful place to investigate the <natural>/unnatural divide within rhetoric surrounding 
bodybuilding today is within the concept of “the freak.” 
“Freaky” Bodies 
 The previous chapter's description of the early era of bodybuilding portrayed a practice 
that was primarily concerned with health, moderation, well-rounded behavior, proportion, and 
functional strength. The winners of bodybuilding competitions were those who did not appear to 
take themselves or their size too seriously, and modeled ideal citizenship in both appearance and 
(theoretically) in behavior. However, the sport has greatly evolved since its inception, and now 
hardly resembles its origins or former champions. In many ways, modern bodybuilding has 
become the antithesis of its early form. From the 1980s onward, bodybuilding has existed within  
a period where notions, vocabularies, and imagery of what has become known as the “freaky” 
body have become dominant. It is important to note that the word “freak” often comes with 
heavy negative connotation. I elect to use the term here both in recognition of its popularity 
within muscle-centric sports, and as a way of teasing out additional meanings for the 
terminology in relation to naturalness.  
   Free from the constraining regulations of the AAU and its Mr. America contests, the 
IFBB and professional bodybuilding emerged in the 1970s as a very different governing entity. 
Athletes vying for the sport's titles found themselves in direct competition with one another, 
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instead of within pursuit of an ideal based on classical themes of the past. Athletes were also 
allowed to compete for however long they could maintain a worthy physique. Joe Weider's 
dream of creating the contest of champions was more than realized in his initiation of Mr. 
Olympia. Legends emerged and competed in spectacular and innovative ways that audiences had 
never seen. Giant bodies with immense muscularity became the new standard. Names like 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, Lee Haney, Dorian Yates, and Frank Zane dominated competitive 
stages.  
Between 1970 and 1992, these four men accounted for twenty of the twenty-two Mr. 
Olympia champions, and their dominance has hardly been matched since. Schwarzenegger has 
been called by the Guinness Book of World Records "the most perfectly developed man in the 
history of the world” (Guinness World Records, 2005, 2004). At 6’ 2’’ and a competition weight 
of 240 lbs., he still towers above most bodybuilders today. Schwarzenegger is especially 
remembered for his incredible 57’’ chest. It has been said that he was almost single-handedly 
responsible for bringing the large male chest into popularity. With his six consecutive Mr. 
Olympia championships (seven overall), he remains one of the most popular names in 
bodybuilding, even despite his retirement. Lee Haney broke Schwarzenegger’s record by 
winning eight Olympia titles of his own. Though his 5’11’’ frame may not have been as 
overwhelming as Schwarzenegger’s, Haney’s chest-to-waist ratio seemed nearly impossible to 
judges and peers alike. The hourglass contour of his body seemed to defy physics. Haney’s 
shocking muscularity came to a peak in his chest and latissimus and then trailed to a vanishing 
point at his waistband. His physique exploded out the other side of his trunks with thigh 
definition that had never before been reached.   
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Figure 4. Lee Haney (Haney and Rosenthal, 1993) 
Dorian “the shadow” Yates, was known to come out of nowhere to win major events. He 
would seclude himself for months and then appear with a physique that left audiences gasping. A 
six-time Mr. Olympia champion, Yates pioneered High Intensity Training to achieve 
otherworldly girth and definition. At only 185 lbs., Frank Zane could not claim the size of the 
other legends of the day, but he became known for packing as much muscle into his frame as 
humanly possible. He held the second thinnest waistline of all Olympia champions (winning 
three titles) and is one of only three men to ever defeat Arnold Schwarzenegger in a 
bodybuilding contest. 
With the greatest names in the sport propelling it forward, each competition became more 
memorable than the last. To dethrone a champion, something new and compelling had to be on 
display. A fresh human form became the unofficial requirement to be able to take home each 
year's growing purse. A model of constant progress was established. Each champion was (and is) 
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expected to be bigger and more unbelievably muscular than the previous champion, even those 
competitors who were defending their title. Understandings of the limits of human muscularity 
also advanced rapidly. The nutritional, exercise, and pharmaceutical sciences found growth 
alongside the bodies that utilized them. Due to the break-neck growth curve fostered by the 
sport’s innovators, the gap between champions and their audience grew to be enormous. 
Winning bodies could no longer effectively carry directly inspirational qualities for the 
everyman; they were functionally unreachable. Rather, these built bodies were something more 
than what humanity had become accustomed to. They had become superhuman, unnatural, and 
even “freaky.” 
 The practice of continually surpassing expected limitations for the human body has 
become one of the primary purposes of bodybuilding in its current age. This has sparked a 
revolutionary vocabulary within bodybuilding that embraces and celebrates the extreme and 
absurd. Pain is progress, punishment is dedication, and to outwork is to outwit. The spectacle of 
the built body is framed within a drama of human nature that is always in an upward arc 
(Hoberman, 2005). From this has emerged a subculture that produces, signifies, and appreciates 
the unnatural, freaky body for the very reason that it is above and beyond expectations of the 
possible and the acceptable. Bodybuilding greatness is now a bottom-up standard that moves as 
it is pushed by its greatest innovators and extremists. The best built bodies of today are “the 
latest miracles in a continuous trajectory of human achievement” (Liokaftos, 2012, p. 135). The 
most creative, and the most successful, experimenter can be looked at as a role model of physical 
human progress. The “freaks” are not simply outcasts and physical outliers (though they are this 
too); they are also athletes so proficient at their pursuits that their existence is barely 
comprehensible to many viewers. Here, at the cutting edge of bodybuilding, we find appreciation 
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for the unnatural for the same reasons that it is normally shunned. Bodies like those carried by 
champions are not “supposed” to look like they do. <Natural> bodies, as we have come to 
understand them, cannot conceivably perform in these ludicrous ways. 
 The unnatural bodies at the highest levels of bodybuilding exist in an elite, qualitatively 
different realm of performance that has become largely unfathomable to those outside of the 
practices themselves. Here, bodybuilding, which once shunned the lazy, unnatural, and 
“malformed” bodies of the early industrial era, venerates the unnatural in ways that push 
boundaries and expand human potential and purpose. This is significant to this study because it 
effectively calls into question both the superiority and accepted definitions of <natural>. If 
human limitation is expanded, the scope of what is <natural> is thrust under review. The further 
the limitation is expanded, the larger the scope of normal <natural> behavior appears to grow. If 
unnatural “freaky” bodies are the ones that are praised for fostering this momentum, perhaps 
unnaturalness can be, situationally, both preferential and productive. 
 As with all striations, however, the distinction between unnatural/<natural> is still not 
complete here, even within a subculture that supposedly holds “freakishness” in high regard. 
Coupled alongside notions of freakishness are rhetorics of <natural> superiority, often appearing 
in discourses involving genetics and predispositions. Though freaky bodies showcase other-
worldly self-discipline, commitment, innovation, and willingness to exceed, they are also revered 
for having elite <natural> biology that incurs definite advantage. In fact, elite bodybuilders often 
explain how they discovered their <natural> gift for body development accidentally or as a result 
of picking up weight training for sports or to imitate the “hard body ideal” emanating from the 
1980s and 90s (Johansson, 1999). <Natural> talent is what separates those who can succeed from 
those who are simply willing to try. Thus, in many ways, <natural> talent is at least as necessary 
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as the unnatural willingness to defy convention. Within bodybuilding communities, 
unnaturalness is the celebrated result, but a level of <natural> influence is required. Though this 
may seem to be another failure of unnaturalness to gain a distinct upper hand, the interplay 
between these striations shows a potential for synergy that could prove hopeful. This realization 
becomes important when considering the purposes and potentials of more striated appearances of 
<natural>, including the separate and unequal divisions within the sport of bodybuilding. 
Testing Naturalness 
Bodybuilding has effectively striated <natural> by creating separate divisions for tested 
and untested competition. This represents the most formal and readily recognizable distinction 
between the terminologies within the sport. In devising this separation, bodybuilding, as an 
organization, designates one division as the domain of the <natural> while working to actively 
obscure the other division's relation to the term. Under this language, tested competition works to 
determine the essential chemical/biological naturalness or unnaturalness of a body. Until this 
determination is made, a competitor assumes the formal benefits of <natural> status despite an 
appearance that might suggest otherwise. Competitors become unnatural by getting caught in one 
of many specific striations that the governing bodies of the sport offer. These striations include: 
any evidence of stimulants such as ephedrine or cocaine; narcotic analgesics such methadone and 
morphine (but codeine is acceptable); evidence of anabolic agents such as clotestbol or a 
testosterone count greater than a six to one ratio (unless for a medical condition); diuretics such 
as mersalyl and mannitol; Human Growth Hormone; and blood doping (“Banned Substances,” 
2008). 
There is even a complicated formula available that is used to help determine a 
competitor’s <natural> physical potential for lean mass. It takes into consideration height in 
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inches, ankle circumference at the smallest point, wrist circumference measured on the hand side 
of the styloid process (the round, bony protrusion at the joint), and the body fat percentage at 
which you want to predict maximum lean body mass. With this formula, someone who is 5’9” 
tall with above-average wrist and ankle size would reach a maximum body weight of 203 lbs. at 
12% body fat. Surpassing this by a statistically significant margin would suggest a competitor is 
not <natural>. Phil Heath, the bodybuilding champion described in the introduction to Chapter 1, 
competes at a weight of 255-260 lbs. at this same height of 5’9’’ with only 6% body fat. Heath is 
currently considered to be the apex of the “freaky” body progression within bodybuilding. 
Obviously, when the formula is applied to him, the result is a resounding pronouncement of 
unnatural, yet from a rules perspective, Heath is not subject to testing and thus assumed 
(functionally) clean. Because of this assumption, Heath retains all the benefits of an otherwise 
<natural> competitor. This same formula has been able to successfully predict winners of natural 
bodybuilding events at an astoundingly accurate rate. The closer natural competitors get to the 
upper limits of this formula’s expectations, the closer they have come to the limits of <natural> 
possibility. In online forums, lifters and fans estimate measurements to try and settle debates 
concerning whether the impressive physique pictured could possibly be <natural>. Even with 
clear circumstantial and anecdotal indications that a body is “enhanced,” the stigma does not 
stick in the same way it would to a failed test. A bodybuilder's unique usefulness in the 
marketing world is often tied to whether or not their results appear as legally reproducible. 
Without definitive proof, a champion’s body is marketable. Thus, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
argue, these striations are directly tied to economic potentiality. 
However, once a bodybuilding athlete is deemed unnatural, they often maintain that 
designation for life. This is unlike most professional sports where the punishment is served after 
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a finite time, even if a stigma lingers. For example, in U.S. American professional football, a 
player can return to competition after missing four games (or one fourth of a season) for the first 
time they are caught with performance enhancing drugs. In baseball, the penalty for a first 
offense is 50 games (about one third of a season) and has so far also resulted in an unofficial loss 
of qualification for the sport’s hall of fame. (Apparently, there is no place for unnatural athletes 
alongside the heroes of the past.) Bodybuilding’s history is littered with those who vehemently 
denied any connection to performance-enhancers and were eventually proven, through testing, to 
have lied. Because <natural> exists as a type of forever threshold, participants in natural 
bodybuilding competitions must submit to a polygraph test to help prove they are lifetime 
natural. If their bodies are shown be unnaturally enhanced in the past, the label remains, even if 
fluid tests disagree (Shepley, 2015). 
The striations natural bodybuilding offers have multidirectional effects. Though they 
provide a working definition of what <natural> is, the definition is not universal. However, as 
with all striations, the divide is assumed to extend beyond the sport. The list of banned 
substances in bodybuilding marks other bodies as “enhanced” or unnatural, even if they aren't 
directly connected with the sport. Since bodybuilding has such historical authority over ideals 
associated with the body, its definition of biological/chemical naturalness matters. 
The striations of natural bodybuilding also offer new smooth space that funnels profit to 
athletes who now have the benefit of the doubt and the benefit of lucrative sponsorships. 
Untested competitors, like Phil Heath, can exist in the liminal smooth space created by the 
striations of natural bodybuilding and use this space to become more financially viable. Untested 
competitors are often upheld as the closest human offering of an ideal physique, but they are not 
required to disclose fully to their discipleship how it was actually obtained. In fact, cultural and 
77 
	
economic forces strongly discourage athletes to be honest about any drug usage. This is true for 
the legal and regulatory reasons listed earlier, but divulging this information may also mean 
losing a claim of inherent superiority. This claim could be forfeited either in the realm of 
<natural> genetics or in claims to super-human dedication and training. Because it does attempt 
to divulge what goes into creating the bodies shown on stage, the tested division of bodybuilding 
casts valuable ambiguity on the non-tested division. It is through this deniability that corporate 
sponsors and top athletes have a platform to become profitable: Other people have been tested 
and failed but our division’s athletes have no such failure on their record. The (arguably 
necessary) lack of transparency has encouraged a dialogue that attaches particular forms of fear, 
disgust, and moral bankruptcy to overly muscular bodies in the form of assumed drug use. 
The Chemically-Enhanced Body 
 The first natural bodybuilding competitions occurred in the mid 1980s and coincided with 
the spreading, nation-wide fear of anabolic steroids. Although performance-enhancing 
substances have been used in competitive events since their origin (Donohoe & Johnson, 1986), 
public fear of “impure” sports was escalated by the failed drug tests of elite athletes at the 1988 
Seoul Olympic Games. Canadian Ben Johnson, known at the time as “the world's fastest man,” 
was found to be using anabolic steroids after his impressive victory in the 100 meters. Many 
regard this event as the moment where steroids were no longer the secret of the gym and instead 
became front page news (Assael, 2007). In 1990, The United States Congress passed the 
Anabolic Steroid Control Act. In the face of significant counter-evidence from many experts, the 
act made all non-medical anabolic steroid use illegal. The substances were immediately labeled 
as Schedule III drugs under the Controlled Substances Act. This meant their usage was legally 
the same as methamphetamine and opium. In 2004, the act was amended in order to also outlaw 
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prohormones, a previously legal line of nutritional aids used primarily by the bodybuilding and 
weightlifting communities. With increased attention and these new rulings, steroids became 
firmly entrenched within the U.S. American rhetoric of the war on drugs. Performance-
enhancing drugs have since been found to have extensive influence across the modern sporting 
world. U.S. Americans took increased notice after steroids began to blemish the “purity” of 
baseball, the sport most directly tied to U.S. American exceptionalism (Butterworth, 2008). Fear 
of steroids escalated to a type of “moral panic” (Cohen, 1973, p. 38) in the years following. 
Steroids and like substances are now widely believed to have significant negative physical and 
emotional health effects in addition to the “unfair” edge they gave to athletes. Steroids are 
thought to be the precursor to uncontrolled behavior, severe health problems, and even fatalities 
(Monaghan, 2001). Today the vocabulary of anabolic substances is so prevalent that it is not 
unusual to hear someone describe an extreme phenomenon as an average scenario “on steroids.” 
Because of its now widespread use as “an all-purpose, fear-generating, rubric akin to terrorism or 
global warming” (Liokaftos, 2012, p. 158), the term steroids could likely be successfully argued 
to function as its own, primarily negative, ideograph. Similar to <natural> but perhaps lesser 
used, steroids is a descriptor and qualifier across contexts, and carries an ideological and political 
agenda with significant historical force. 
 Bodybuilding's close association with both real and ideographic steroids, as well as other 
anabolic or illegal substances, has brought the sport a significant amount of negative attention. 
Realizations have been made that couple elite physiques with the knowledge that many, if not 
all, elite bodybuilders use some form of these drugs. Bodybuilding became largely recognized as 
the epicenter of drug abuse within the sporting world. To many, drugs were at the “psychological 
core” of the sport. Thus both bodybuilders and bodybuilding practices have been characterized as 
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unstable, irrational, risky, and even pathological (Liokaftos, 2012). These beliefs are reinforced 
by media portrayals of the results of “'roid rage.” In 1998, Sports Illustrated published an article 
entitled “The Muscle Murders” (Nack, 1998). In this especially popular write-up, the danger 
within the “insular, narcissistic subculture of hardcore bodybuilding” (p. 100) was printed for the 
world to see. This publication became emblematic of the journalistic approach to steroid usage 
within the sporting world. Simply by association with steroid usage, the bodies involved in 
bodybuilding have often been understood by much of the outside world as more irresponsible 
than impressive. To be a bodybuilder is to claim a largely maligned identity. This is perhaps why 
people like myself elect other identity markers instead. Bodybuilders are often characterized as 
“monstrous” individuals, both in size and in absence of morality. 
 Not surprisingly, within the sport of bodybuilding, a much different view of steroids is 
held. Drug use for bodybuilding purposes is often an extremely calculated and technical process 
involving cutting-edge research and scientific innovation. What is considered entirely irrational 
by outsiders, is entirely rational among the elite performers of the sport. Using the technological 
advancements of today's age is part of the logical progression of a sport that is almost uniformly 
concerned with pushing the potentials of the possible. Within a paradigm that values efficiency, 
results, and the maximization of performance, use of performance-enhancing substances fits in 
neatly amongst a largely shared mentality of constant growth. That being said, bodybuilding is 
not nearly the “everything goes” atmosphere that it is often depicted as. Within “hardcore” 
bodybuilding communities there is a type of code that informally outlines the proper usage of 
pharmaceutical technology. Anabolic and other potentially dangerous substances are to be used 
in rational, educated, and responsible ways. This approach to drug use classifies the practice as a 
calculated and informed risk towards a goal of individual enhancement within a larger project of 
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the self (Monaghan, 2001). Many outside of bodybuilding view the use of drugs as a defilement 
of authenticity and find the use of drugs to achieve self-fulfillment as disturbing (Parens, 1998). 
However, many others do not share these reservations. Within bodybuilding circles, drug use, 
responsibly administered, is accepted and is effectively a “naturalized” practice. It is a behavior 
that comes with the territory of constantly pushing human potential. 
 Even within bodybuilding culture, however, there are classifications of fake and 
unnatural practices and people. This is still true even in relation to a body's chemical makeup. 
Bodybuilders, especially those of previous eras, chastise those competitors willing to “abuse” 
pharmaceuticals in order to achieve a particular look. Today's winning competitors must be 
large, fat free, and “dry” (meaning no subcutaneous water retention, allowing muscular striations 
to be easily perceived). This means that competitors now inject more than just anabolic steroids; 
they must also consider using growth hormones, insulin (as not to lose mass during periods of 
dieting), and diuretics. Many bodybuilders believe there is a threshold that takes drug usage too 
far, though they admit it is difficult to name. Another interesting case is that of Synthol, a legal, 
oil-based substance used to temporarily inflate the size of muscles at the point of injection. 
Interestingly enough, the majority of bodybuilders find the use of this substance repulsive as it 
doesn't give a clear articulation of the work an athlete has put in towards gaining their 
musculature. Bodybuilders often claim an ability to read the effort and development that is 
inscribed on a body (Monaghan, 2001). Absent of these markers, a body can appear synthetic or 
unearned to the trained eye. Abuse of drugs and use of Synthol do not fit in the bodybuilding 
version of narratives of authenticity, and such users can be labeled as fake or negatively 
unnatural even within hardcore bodybuilding communities. 
 As these examples illustrate, a chemically-enhanced body is far from a static definition. 
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Insiders and outsiders of bodybuilding communities carry very different standards towards the 
meaning of performance-enhancing drugs, and also what constitutes appropriate interaction with 
these substances. However, the vocabulary of both groups foregrounds the apparent 
“unnaturalness” of a person’s features through proximity with certain dosages of drugs (whether 
real or assumed). Though the striations are less distinct within hardcore bodybuilding 
communities, striations yet exist. There appears to be a functional line associated with 
pharmaceutical usage that has the power to sort out the super-human from the sub-human. The 
differing beliefs concerning these <natural> vs. unnatural practices can be tied to what Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987) understand as the contrasting principles of “becoming” and “progress.” 
Smooth “Becoming” and Striated “Progress” 
As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe it, smooth space is “where all becoming 
happens” (p. 486). In their understanding, becoming is the quest toward a desire that exists not 
out of a recognizable deficit or lack, but out of a pursuit of being something other than the 
already determined role in which one has presumably been cast. This type of becoming can only 
occur in smooth space because if there are delineations already existing, one is only able to move 
between already existing categories created through the apparatus of capture. In this case, one is 
not becoming when they change from a natty to a geared athlete; they are simply being cast in a 
different role by the governing state. It could be argued, though, that, free to use chemical 
enhancements as they see fit, bodybuilders are better able to become since they are not reduced 
to once-limiting categories of bodily human potential. Free from testing, these athletes are free to 
be more than a category determined by the content of their urine and blood. Untested 
bodybuilders thus uniquely demonstrate resistance to what is supposed to be a normative human 
limitation and also work to expand a definition of what it might mean to be (or be within) a 
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human body. “Freaky” bodies are able to become something different from what governing 
bodies (what Deleuze and Guattari call the “superior organism”) allow them to be when these 
bodies operate within smooth spaces. For reasons such as these, smooth space is often the 
desired realm for resistance towards an oppressive force. 
In contrast, striations can work to limit smooth space and becoming, and are necessarily 
resisted as vehicles of oppression. Divisions create classifications of superiority and demarcate 
the realms of the possible. Within striated territories, it is often required that a person or thing 
fall within one of a set of already approved categories. Supposedly all-encompassing groupings 
such as gender binaries demonstrate how striations can take this oppressive form. Without 
leaving another option, this particular striation requires a person either choose a distinction they 
might not fully avow to, or endure marginalization. Some advocates offer incorporation of yet 
another striated space that promotes a third gender option as a remedy to binary representations 
of gender. An example of this would be the legislative action in Germany that offers intersex 
children (or rather, their parents) “X” rather than “M” or “F” as options for birth certificates and 
passports (Hoover, O’Neil, & Poutiatine, 2013). Though it can be argued that a third option 
includes and is considerate of more bodies, the striation also can be said to further marginalize 
bodies that still do not fit into any of the three categories or those who wish to unyoke 
themselves from the potentially troublesome designations altogether. At the same time, there are 
times where gendered distinctions can be useful. It would, for example, be difficult to look at 
gender discrimination lawsuits without a classification of gender on which to rely. 
This is also the case regarding questions of (dis)ability status. A person is often forced 
between accepting the stigmatizing striation of being understood a disabled body (even if this is 
not how the person self-identifies), or they are compelled to assimilate to conditions that are not 
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fully accessible to their body. Again, it is not the particular striations that are at fault, rather the 
lack of freedom emanating from the level of striation. The designator “disabled” is not inherently 
problematic. Rather it is the larger context surrounding disability that works to inhibit fluid 
interpretations of what it means to be a disabled body that brings issue. Less “complete” 
striations could benefit those bodies that are inadequately labeled within this particular 
vocabulary. In this study's particular bodybuilding context, these theoretical striations mirror 
closely the categorizations between tested-natural, and tested-fail, two semantically impermeable 
poles that I have shown do not fully reflect a spectrum of human experience, especially across 
different communities. 
In contrast to the negativity surrounding striated space, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) also 
remind us that striated space is still “where all progress occurs” (p. 486). Thus striated space 
offers a considerable amount of potential beyond violence. Before praising striated space for this 
distinction unconditionally, it is important to note here that there is certainly more reservation in 
the way Deleuze and Guattari deploy progress than the way it is typically understood. For 
progress to exist, there must first be some standard by which it can be measured or at least 
understood. For this reason, it would be impossible for progress to occur in anything other than 
the striated space formed by possibly problematic demarcations. This does not mean progress 
should be assumed as always “wrong” either. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) offer a different 
understanding of progress—as unbound potentiality. This progress is movement that is not 
foreseeable through the lens of historical goals, but instead is a reformulation of a future based in 
ever-evolving desire. Thus progress for these philosophers is anything but linear. Instead it 
involves constant reformulation, backtracking, and pursuit of new directions. Progress must be 
understood as part of the will of a population, and not as a device that controls their actions. 
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 It is not much of a stretch to argue that it would be progress, in one usage of the term, 
for measures to be enacted that effectively discouraged dangerous drug usage in children or that 
more equally compensated illegal-drug free competitors with sponsorships. This progress, if 
isolated from the consequences that may also result from the enactment, would largely be 
regarded in a positive light. It is the intervening and concurrent variables in this equation that can 
be understood as troublesome: Such action would potentially eliminate the space for becoming 
that untested competition allows and further separate and stigmatize certain bodies as definitively 
(and possibly irredeemably) unnatural. It is likely impossible to enact any umbrella measures that 
consistently distinguish between the productive and the problematic variables. How then are we 
to act in a socially just, reflexive way in relation to our approach to striations if a “smooth space 
alone is [also] never enough to save us” (p. 500) as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest? 
Perhaps there are ways. 
Why <Natural>? Casting the Gaze Back 
 These contested understandings of <natural> exist as potential arenas for resistance and 
reclamation as well as potential problems. A different construction of <natural> may discourage 
people, especially youths, from prematurely destroying their organs with potentially dangerous 
substances unwittingly. On the other hand, the desire for this distinction certainly does not 
excuse or attempt to deny the potential of delineations of <natural> to violate human rights. The 
historicity of the ideograph, as well as the way it has been deployed to cause harm, is not 
escapable, nor should it be. This conflict is one that could easily lead an otherwise concerned 
individual down a path of inaction that leads to an equally problematic status quo. The given 
options certainly appear to be a paradox, but they do not have to be. 
I believe one possible course of action involves turning the theo-critical gaze that 
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stigmatizes the “unnatural” back on to the ideograph itself. Investigation into the historical uses 
of the term has revealed a landscape for the use of <natural> that does not nearly approach the 
moral superiority the term has inherited. The most recent eras of bodybuilding are one example 
where vocabularies appreciating “unnaturalness” have developed that perhaps challenge the 
assumed superiority of <natural>. Another way this can be accomplished is by highlighting the 
smooth spaces between areas of supposed distinction between <natural> and unnatural. Thus far 
I have illustrated bodybuilding's capacity to striate <natural> but I believe it has the potential to 
do more, and in some ways, it already has. 
Combining <Natural> Animal and Unnatural Machine 
 Throughout its history, bodybuilding has revealed itself to be technophilic in at least one 
of many ways. At its beginnings, physical culturists may have resented the technological 
advances that lessened the need for physical labor, but answered this distaste by implementing 
their own technological language of bodily improvement. Though certain technologies were said 
to be at the center of blame for the “soft, malformed” bodies of the day, it was also technology 
that allowed an escape from this lifestyle. The most recent eras of bodybuilding have relied 
extensively on technological melioration as well. This has come in the form of advancements in 
exercise science, improved exercise machinery, and progress in the areas of nutrition and 
pharmaceuticals. Bodybuilding is a sport heavily involved with breaking longstanding barriers, 
and technology often is what makes significant breakthroughs possible. It is often bodybuilders 
who invent or popularize the technologies of growth. Bodybuilders and cutting edge 
technologies have been intertwined for many years. 
 If human action is considered unnatural (as the arguments of Chapter Two appear to 
illustrate), it stands to reason that human technology would be understood as more unnatural yet. 
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Technology, by definition, is essentially human in origin and intravenous to a status quo. It is 
what humans have used to usurp our order in the food chain; it is what has disrupted potential 
courses of history; and it is the means to overthrow a presumed <natural> order. Technology is 
the medium of human expansion. Humanity often separates the moral platitudes of “science” and 
technology because of these implications. If we are to listen to popular sentiment, science is 
simple recognition or discovery of an already existing <natural> order, while technology directly 
influences and redirects this order (Soper, 1995). Technology that is not widely understood often 
further incites fear and questions about humanity's cosmic place and our potential to overstep it. 
It is no surprise then that bodybuilding's unnaturalness coincides with its proximity to 
technology. This distrust is perhaps more uniquely tied to bodybuilding than some other 
technological fields. Bodybuilders are likely more susceptible to accusations of unnaturalness 
than those who work in, say, mechanical engineering because bodybuilders are seen to be 
tampering with the fibers of an individual's living existence, not just tools that can be picked up 
or discarded at will. In this regard, bodybuilding is more akin to genetic engineering. 
 Bodybuilding illustrates an apex of human technology, and full use of Deleuze and 
Guattari's (1987) “apparatus of capture.” Particular movements, regimens, and programs are 
meticulously developed, tested, and reformulated to coax the best possible results out of human 
anatomy. Over time, information on muscular hypertrophy and related subjects has grown and 
has been more widely disseminated. A person can now find out exactly what they are projected 
to be. In my time involved in bodybuilding activities, I have used programs that have been 
specific enough to tell me how many reps and sets of which exercises to do on each day of the 
calendar year. I have even worked from a manual that directed me on a precise number of eggs 
and blueberries to eat in a day, and was scaled to my specific weight and body type. Years of 
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research and experience tell me that I am a classified as a mesomorph (a medium weight-gainer), 
with below-average bone size genetics and favorable muscle insertion-point aesthetics. My arms 
are of average length and my legs are fairly short for my height, but my torso is longer than 
average. Because of these attributes, I dwell in a frame that would fit best in a bodybuilding 
“fitness” event, and I could likely never make it to any competitive stage where the “real” 
muscle men and women roam. My potentials have been clearly documented and thoroughly 
striated through bodybuilding's technological advancements.    
 The interesting foil to bodybuilding’s conceptual place as technophilic is its coinciding 
animalistic representation. This represents the other side of the chemical/technological “freak” 
described earlier. Animalism is described by Liokaftos (2012) as being based in the constructions 
of human sex/gender difference that are formed through biological binaries. Animalism is a 
search for the <natural> primordial self by tracing humanity to its most fundamental and basic 
purposes (Fussell, 1991). Within bodybuilding culture, pursuing the animal self is a positive 
desire. It is not understood as destructive, impulsive, or irrational, but rather as reverence toward, 
and capture of, a force more primal and powerful than one's own (Hoberman, 2005). Animalism 
becomes an embodied practice of reversion towards supposed hormonal instincts and drives, but 
also towards progress that was not historically attainable. In this way, bodybuilding yet holds to 
its Early Era roots. Bodybuilders push past the laziness, weakness, and deterioration in the selves 
they were given, and push towards a raw, boundless, uncontainable self in a primal form 
(Liokaftos, 2012). Even it its similarity, the modern incarnation remains distinct from the vision 
of the first bodybuilders because this effort is no longer understood to be a social task for 
everyone, but rather an intense experience for those who elect a path of extraordinariness. To be 
only human is understood as elected mediocrity. By becoming animalistic, a person significantly 
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adds to their bodybuilding potential. 
 This animalistic mode of production in bodybuilding again finds parallel to the language 
of Deleuze and Guattari (1987). The scholars refer to processes such as these as pursuits toward 
“becoming-animal.” This refers to a type of a movement where the subject no longer chooses to 
occupy a realm of stability but rather enters into a nomadic mode of existence where they are 
always an anomaly and inaccessible to any true form of definition. This change is a move from a 
unified body, marked by pieces, borders, and completion, to “flesh” which is in a continuing 
state of re-articulation, transformation, and growth. In becoming-animal, a person “smooths” 
their flesh so that it is more difficult to classify within current vocabularies, harder to predict, and 
more difficult to control through existing means. A person can never fully become-animal as 
long as they retain personhood, but within certain “plateaus” (intense moments that challenge the 
normal) this realm of transformation can momentarily manifest on a particular body. There are 
moments where I have felt this animalism, especially during particularly difficult workouts. At 
moments where I felt my body begin to fail, I have disassociated from an existence as a distinct 
being seeking to be whole, and been forced to accept myself as an articulation of formed flesh. In 
the midst of these plateaus I am ignoring civilized thought for a desire to become something 
different than what I am expected to be. When I have allowed myself to accept the 
transformative pain of being “just flesh,” I have found my most fruitful progress. 
 Invoking this type of animalism is not a widely embraced practice outside of 
bodybuilding and hardcore athletic circles. In the previous chapters I have discussed how, 
although humans prefer the <natural>, we require a morality that surpasses that of nature. 
Humans desire to be <natural>, but only to the point that we remain distinct from it. Otherwise 
nature and humanity might sully each other with their proximity. Elite bodybuilding practices 
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take the pursuit of naturalness too far by conventional standards. Through seemingly ridiculous 
training and food regimens, bodybuilders punish themselves to achieve an animalism that has 
little regard for the “better judgment” of humanity. They are beasts, freaks, machines, and 
animals, and are often referred to as such. Sometimes these references are done amongst other 
athletes in complimentary ways. “You were a beast in here today, brother” is about as high a 
compliment as a gym environment has ever bestowed on me. Because of this perception and 
vocabulary, bodybuilders are seen as both overly technophilic and also too animalistic. Said 
another way, these individuals are both too <natural> and not <natural> enough. The elite built 
body paradoxically represents the combination of both poles, apparently without adequately 
representing the more “normal” middle ground. Still, bodybuilders are able to innovate, and 
circumvent seeming limitations. Here we find a type of synergy between too <natural> and too 
unnatural, one that might challenge the efficacy of both ideographic striations. 
 Although the machine and the animal are often relegated to opposite sides in discussions 
of naturalness, they exist together in the realm of elite bodybuilding. The two represent the 
constitutive elements of the “freak” body named earlier. Liokaftos (2012) refers to the machine 
and the animalistic as the covalent parts of an aesthetic of intensity. He believes this intensity is 
on full display within bodybuilding, and that it is especially recognizable in particular images. 
One example is the image of a lifter shown exerting maximum effort while pulling on a 
futuristic-looking weight machine. With a contorted facial expression and bulging muscle 
definition, the “animal inside” intermingles with machinery to accomplish a single task.  
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Figure 5. Bodybuilder using preacher curl machine 
(Tumminello, 2012) 
Here seemingly opposite components converge toward synergistic effect. The animal body and 
mentality is under control of a highly technical program designed toward peak growth. Within 
the paradigm of intensity, the civilized, scientific body meets the primal body and creates 
something that is fully neither but also not a tempered version of either extreme (Mognahan, 
2001). This bears significance into the investigation of ideographic <natural> for two reasons: 
1. The paradigm of intensity within bodybuilding shows the slippages of smooth and 
striated spaces of <natural> in tangible practice. <Natural> vs. unnatural does not 
play out cleanly. Even within the world of bodybuilding, a place that purposely 
striates the terms, the two types of spaces cannot fully remain distinct and are 
both necessary. 
2. The paradigm of intensity showcases the capability of a single body to house 
positive characteristics of both the <natural> and unnatural, and harness (and 
perhaps sometimes unharness) both potentials to accomplish new conceptions of 
the possible. 
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In the following chapter I operate from these premises to directly investigate the 
supposed superiority of <natural> and our (in)ability to read it. I believe the way 
<natural>/unnatural intermingle synergistically within bodybuilding offers an illustration of our 
greatest hope towards confronting the paradoxical problem of smooth and striated spaces. It is 
my hope that in using bodybuilding as a particularized example of a larger rhetorical 
phenomenon, we can gain a further understanding of how ideographic striation can be more 
productively confronted.  
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CHAPTER IV  
RECONSTRUCTING <NATURAL> 
Introduction 
 In the first three chapters of this study I have explored the ideographic power of 
<natural>, especially in relation to bodies. I have shown <natural> to have extensive influence in 
the ways U.S. Americans attach significance, value, and morality to particular actions and, as a 
result, how these attributes become attached to people. I have also illustrated organized 
bodybuilding as an arena where determinations of <natural> vs. unnatural are both expressly and 
implicitly enforced, providing a larger precedent for even those not directly involved with the 
sport. Finally, I applied the framework and vocabularies of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) 
smooth and striated spaces to demonstrate the theoretical process of ideographic crystallization 
and its consequence. I concluded the previous chapter by alluding to the idea that an apparatus of 
capture can striate a previously smooth space of resistance towards oppressive ends. However, I 
have also noted that the interplay between what is smooth and what is striated leaves opportunity 
to challenge existing conventions if certain rhetorical approaches to existing terminology are 
taken up. 
In the current chapter, I center the discussion on the philosophical and ideological 
groundings of <natural> toward an applied investigation into alternative considerations of 
<natural> and unnatural bodies. Here, I apply the turn I offered in Chapter Three by directly 
challenging the ingrained assumptions of, and formalized references to, <natural> superiority. I 
do this by interrogating the merit and necessity of <natural>. I then move to a theoretical 
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explanation of what a more practical and responsible <natural> might look like, still (mostly) 
within the confines of our current paradigm. 
 I use this chapter to bring into question our methods of knowing and recognizing 
<natural> within a given context. When we discuss naturalness and recognize where <natural> 
has gone through an apparatus of capture, it is important to recognize what it is we are making 
reference to. Only after this recognition is made can our practical approaches to the uses of 
ideographic <natural> be tailored to become less harmful. It may also be possible to retain the 
influential characteristics of <natural> to help guide just action. A primary intent of this chapter 
is to encourage a number of considerations to be taken before an ideographic <natural> is 
deployed.  These considerations involve the following guiding questions that I will explore in 
this chapter: 
1. What is the philosophical reference point beckoned forth when <natural> is used to 
describe bodies and processes? 
2. What is the specific communicative utility of choosing <natural> as a descriptor 
given this reference point? 
3. What are the consequences of reifying an iteration of naturalness through this choice?	
By investigating these questions, it is possible to critique not only the results of a 
crystallizing/striated/regulated <natural>, as has been done so far in this study, but also analyze 
the purpose and necessity of <natural> more generally. If these considerations are successfully 
satisfied, it becomes possible to envision a less dualistic <natural> than is normally assumed. 
This deeper investigation also holds the potential to provide useful insight into the reasoning that 
labels certain people and practices as unnatural. 
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It is my belief that within a given setting, an “unnatural” body can become the 
transgressive body of influential change that we ought to strive toward becoming. This opposes 
the convention that treats the unnatural more as a fearful specter we attempt to formally exorcise 
through striated standardization. The philosophical and metaphysical arguments I make here all 
lend evidence to a contention that unnatural bodies are bodies that might: be read differently; 
expand notions of “the nature of a kind” and the possible; and challenge institutional stagnation. 
I intend to show that these bodies are the very bodies necessary for any process of “real” 
becoming. To do this, I offer ways we can envision productive blending and blurring of the 
illusionary natural/unnatural dichotomy. I also investigate how our transgression of formalized 
naturalness destabilizes many of our problematic normative conceptions about bodies, including 
those relating to race, gender, and sexuality. It is my intention in this chapter to substantiate 
alternate ways of understanding how we can productively valorize the unnatural body as 
resistance to a mythic, always morally superior, <natural>.	 I believe the first step in this process 
is complicating the assumption that <natural> is always preferential. 	
<Natural> Superiority? 
 <Natural> presently exists as an entrenched ideograph that carries various connotations 
of superiority. If a person or object is/acts/appears recognizably more <natural> in form or 
substance, this entity will often hold a majority preference over a less <natural> option. Our 
collective preferences for <natural> food, bodies, and behavior showcase just how prevalent and 
even instinctual this partiality has become. However, this construct of <natural> superiority is 
neither required nor philosophically stable. As I have shown already, <natural> is term that is 
anything but stable, and is often, at best, arbitrary. Investigation of this instability is one avenue 
of uprooting the seemingly irreproachable, ideographic <natural>.  
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 One instable attribute of <natural> involves disagreement about which philosophical 
realm of origin <natural> can most rightly claim. There are several schools of thought governing 
premises of nature and <natural>, but there are a few approaches that bear recognition here. 
Some, like environmental historians, assign a particular agency to <natural> that allows its 
characteristics to remain seemingly self-determined over time (Demerritt, 1994). Nature is said 
to have a <natural> will that brings about its own redefinition. A status of <natural> is 
considered a domain with unique, pre-existing characteristics. The benefits of this perspective 
are that it allows <natural> to have some root as a “signified” beyond only a symbolic referent. 
From this point, it is possible to discuss <natural> as more than passing ether, but doesn’t require 
the term/entity remain only static. On the other hand, this perspective largely ignores 
interpretations of <natural> as a type of social construct. Instead, those who consider <natural> 
to have agency prefer a representation of the ideograph as inherent to, and contingent on, a larger 
force above and beyond the immediate influence of symbolic human usage (Demerritt, 1994). In 
summation, this perspective places humans as mere observers and recognizers of a powerful 
outward entity. 
Meanwhile, more interpretive groups, like cultural geographers, almost entirely ignore 
any imagining of nature or naturalness that would represent it as an autonomous actor (Gerber, 
1997). Instead, people of this persuasion view <natural> entirely as a social construct without 
any necessary ties to how things “truly are.” Nature is a human invention, devoid of any 
necessary material root, and only exists during its symbolic use. Usefully, this perspective makes 
<natural> and its problematic definitional qualities quite open to manipulation. However, this 
type of thinking leaves very little room for any tangible or agreed-upon reference, thus making it 
especially difficult to ensure that any decided change is being rightfully applied. Within this 
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paradigm, humans are the creators of nature, but nature only exists as far as social agreement 
allows. There is no anchor for the term beyond what we allow it. 
 Debates about the origin and proper depiction of <natural> fall firmly within the 
nature/culture dualism that has long been entrenched within the Enlightenment of Western 
thought. Choosing to align with either dualist depiction does little to resolve the problematic 
potential of <natural>, as it leaves concerned parties either without a point of reference or 
without agency to make significant change. To successfully re-imagine <natural>, it is likely that 
both of these perspectives must be cast aside, or perhaps combined, for a type of hybrid. When 
this is done, <natural> can become an exemplar of what Gerber (1997) refers to as a “natural 
construct.”  
In her definition, Gerber (1997) stresses the evolving symbiotic relationship between the 
observable material realties of a phenomenon and the ways we come to explain and understand 
them. Gerber’s primary example for explaining this perspective is through the human body. She 
notes that both humans as physical bodies, and humanity as an exclusionary concept, evolved 
concurrently, and trying to highlight one part of this development as responsible for the 
development of the other is impossible. The material, embodied, cell-based, bi-pedal human has 
developed simultaneously alongside the tool-using, word-creating species such that these 
developments, intermingled, are the only possible answer to “what is a human being?” Gerber 
reminds us that for knowledge to exist about any subject there must also be a center of 
experience and action with which to process the abstraction. In this case, the material body thus 
receives “real,” material information and processes it into transferable knowledge that then gains 
temporal contextuality, and may continue to develop as necessary. In this sense, the human body 
is both real, in flux, and socially constructed. 
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Gerber’s definition of natural construct strongly resembles Haraway’s (1991) concept of 
the cyborg. Both concepts reject the ideas of clean boundaries between conceptions of nature and 
human. Instead there is a “chimeric, monstrous” world of fusions (p. 175). In this case, the fusion 
can be understood as between that which predates humans, and that which we socially create and 
enforce. Both of these perspectives focus on the materiality of life, but still through the 
perspective of the importance of symbol choices in defining our world. Like both of these 
authors, I believe that breaking down the essentialness of categories without wholly discarding 
these categories is often necessary, especially if the goal is to successfully recreate a more 
justice-based <natural>. Though our current use is unsatisfactory, the material reality to which it 
refers (if we can agree such a thing exists) still requires attention. Certain grammars are always 
political and require constant investigation in order to recognize their marginalizing impact. 
Ideographs are prime examples of such instances, and <natural> lends itself as an exemplar.  
 If the model of “natural constructs” is applied to investigation of ideographic <natural>, a 
type of potential is unlocked. In this application, the term is granted a rooting in material reality 
that can allow for practical application, and <natural>’s place as only a presumed pre-human 
authority is simultaneously uprooted, or at least loosened. Without a place of securely guarded 
mythology to suppress interrogation, assumptions of naturalness must prove merit either through 
a “real” basis in observable material reality or through symbolic human utility. This approach 
probes what <natural> does and should mean as it dissolves the footing of appeals to tradition. 
Also, if this approach is applied, careful “regulation” of the influential term again becomes 
possible, if and when there is a justly founded, evidentiary basis for the implementation. In 
summary of this applied perspective, if a status of <natural> is to be claimed, it must refer either 
to a currently observable state of order, or arise out of communicative necessity.  
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 Obviously such an application is largely theoretical and is unlikely to immediately come 
to pass. This type of paradigmatic change is difficult to enact, and it would take much for any 
significant alteration to appear even if we were granted our imaginary implementation. However, 
the conjectural use of this standard leads to a line of investigative questioning that may actually 
yield productive results toward changing the ways <natural> is currently deployed. This is where 
our listed considerations come directly into play. First, the question must be asked: what is the 
common grounding (in either material reality or shared philosophical reasoning) that <natural> 
can claim? Is there a reference point or points that can be conceded? Secondly, if we are to apply 
a standard of communicative utility to the usage of <natural>, what would/should such a 
standard look like? Answering these first two questions should provide adequate guidance to 
confront the third: Does this use of <natural> in this instance do more to reify an existing 
problematic natural, or does it productively alter our vision of <natural> in the context it is used? 
In answering these questions, it is unlikely that a universal yardstick will be found on how, 
exactly, <natural> should or should not be used. In fact, if this approach is successfully 
undertaken, there can be no assumed yardstick. Regardless, the pursuit of these questions may 
outline the critical rhetorical process required to re-imagine a more socially just ideograph. The 
remainder of this chapter will attempt to foreground the significance of the first two questions, 
and begin a discussion of the third that will be more adequately addressed in the concluding 
chapter.  
What is <Natural>? 
 Although I have previously established that <natural> is largely indefinable, the pursuit 
of more responsible treatment of bodies, interpreted through the use of ideographic <natural>, 
requires recognition of the philosophy that dominates the conception of <natural> we hope to 
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alter. As Hausman and Kennedy (1975) remind us, most of our conceptual thinking as it relates 
to naturalness is traceable to the early philosophy of Aristotle. Aristotle believed that the nature 
of things is derivative of their categorical qualities, even more so than anything scientific 
empiricism can grant. He understood all qualities of an object or organism to fall into categories 
of either essential or accidental characteristics. Essential qualities are those required for a thing 
to be a thing. Humans are essentially rational and symbol using creatures. Sand is essentially 
grainy. On the other hand, sand is not unmade sand if it is wet or has a reddish hue. And 
(theoretically) humans should not lose their humanness based on pigmentation, size, or hair 
length. To Aristotle, when we refer to objects or beings, we are referring to their nature. 
Discussions over attributes or properties dwell within the less consequential realm of 
accidentals: Humans are accidentally taller than six feet or accidentally have blue eyes. A thing 
being <natural> then becomes dependent on it having the necessary characteristics of its kind. 
Through distinctions related to essential qualities, objects are natured.  
 Once an object is natured, it is limited in the types of alterations it can undergo. Too 
much change, and the object would no longer contain the essential elements of its type. 
Transversely, objects are only capable of changing insofar as their type allows. For example, if 
an acorn becomes a tree, this change is congruent with the expectations of its type, and verifies 
its place as a <natural> acorn. However, if the acorn somehow hatches to become a tiger, the 
object was not ever rightly considered an acorn at all. In Aristotle’s philosophy, any change or 
deviation that occurs is merely simple and foretold actualization. A thing does exactly what it is 
capable of, as determined by its nature. From this viewpoint, all change is teleological rather than 
causal− that is, what happens later explains the reasoning for what is happening now. This 
perspective, though nearly always evidentially correct, has the distinct advantage of hindsight for 
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making determinations and is not especially applicable beyond evaluation afterward. “If it 
happened, then it was supposed to” is hardly a socially or scientifically useful approach when 
attempting to correct or predict behavior. 
 The primary challenge in applying this simple philosophy is determining which attributes 
can and should be classified as essential or accidental. As we might imagine, this is a difficult 
and consequential process. Many of us learned at a young age that biology uses a version of this 
system of order to classify types, all the way from kingdoms to species. These classifications are 
often longstanding, but their applications are muddled as new information about genomes and 
ancestral trees are discovered. For example, one general rule for the classification of species is 
that they cannot cross produce fruitful offspring with another species. However, many species 
within the genus Canis can and do produce offspring capable of reproduction; like dogs and 
wolves. Over time, our assumptions about essential categories are loosened or confirmed through 
observed evidence, though we are often reluctant to make significant changes to organizing 
principles. Even if it is correct to do so, large-scale changes are not preferential to conceding 
exceptions to the rule.  
In application to the context of human bodies, this classification method makes 
considerable difference. Scientifically, there is very little modern dispute over the essential 
characteristics of what it means to be human. However, phrenology and other pseudoscientific 
practices have used such definitional patterns to attach categorical value to persons and groups. 
For example, from the early 17th century until after the Second World War, a significant number 
of popular, supposedly scientific, studies proliferated the belief that Caucasians descended from 
temperate climates were a more evolved partition of the human species (Barkan, 1992).  More 
recently, facets of social, educational, and legal practices continue to make important 
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determinations about essential vs. accidental human characteristics and behavior, including 
definitions of <natural> and unnatural bodies. This is especially true in relation to treatment of 
people with “unusual” bodies. Certainly the extreme bodybuilders mentioned previously would 
be included here. They are larger, and more proficient at muscle growth than the essential 
human. For similar reasons, those with profound mental and/or physical disabilities do not 
immediately (or easily recognizably) seem to fit some of the definitional characteristics of social 
humans. There has been significant resistance related to rights and accommodations for these 
populations, partially traceable back to their designated place amongst expected bodily 
performance. Aristotelian thinking believes that uniformity and remaining “at rest” are the 
<natural> state of things. Divergence from any understood state of being requires some sort of 
explanation; consistency requires none. Of course, the location of this place of rest is largely 
dependent on the interests of populations and individuals who have inherited the privilege to 
define such parameters. Either way, once a system of agreement is in place for an object (that is, 
the object becomes “natured”), deviations encourage scrutiny. This inquiry happens because any 
deviation insinuates a departure from our assumed <natural> order. Often it is simply the 
classification that is wrong, but ingrained schemas are not easily toppled. It is far easier to 
pronounce non-expected actions or features as a violation of a prescribed order. 
 Under this Aristotelian framework, it would logically follow that all exhibited 
characteristics of humans would be explainable as part of their kind: If humans do something, 
this action must be human action by definition. However this does little to establish any shared 
forward vision for human activity or morality. For this reason, striated, normative grounds are 
established either through direct regulation, social pressure, or tradition. As striations increase, 
expectations grow firmer and an apparent uniformity develops: smoothness out of high striation. 
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As a result, over the course of human history, nearly every noticeable human characteristic has at 
some time either been considered a deviation from the <natural> or at the very least, a symptom 
from a deviation of the natural (Hausman & Kennedy, 1975). Over time these deviations have 
been medically treated, penalized, exiled, persecuted, or praised depending on their level of 
deviation and utility.  
One reason for this confusion is that natures are only attributable to kinds and not 
individuals. Individual cases can only be described as derivative of the larger kinds and not 
natures unto themselves. This can explain some of the fear and discouragement that accompanies 
practices such as bodybuilding. As a rule, humans maintain an average body fat percentage 
between 18.5 and 30% (“What is a Normal Body Fat?”, n.d.). Top bodybuilders exhibit levels 
between 4 and 7% body fat, numbers considered nearly impossible or at the very least, extremely 
dangerous at the weights these champions maintain. In the same thread, the average human 
biceps measurement is around 13.5 inches (“What Is Average Bicep Size?”, n.d.). Male 
bodybuilders cannot win Mr. Olympia with less than 22-inch arms, and some elite performers 
have even managed to double the human average. These athletes demonstrate unique 
performance, genetic disposition, and metabolism that are considered unnatural for human kind, 
and would be classified as deviant. However, if natures were instead applied to individuals, these 
performances (while still outstanding) would obviously require the results be looked upon as 
within the realm of the possible. To take this further, in this particular example, a bodybuilder 
with an especially low level of body fat would be understood as within his/her realm of variance 
and one of the world’s top athletes. A non-athlete with this same condition would likely be 
considered pathogenic and in very ill health. One person, under different comparative 
measurements, is either <natural> or is not (in one sense of the word). Thus, the status is almost 
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entirely dependent on the measuring stick that is used to determine whether or not a practice is or 
is not <natural>.  
Because of its immediately identifiable impact, the “measuring sticks” used to determine 
<natural> status can be thought of as one of the “philosophical reference points” required for 
meaningful discussions about a more responsible ideograph. Such measures are often, luckily, 
much more identifiable than any stable definitions of the abstract ideograph. As the argument of 
this study presumes, there are always dangers associated with the implementation of these 
measuring devices. This is, of course, immediately relatable to the regulatory measures and 
striations discussed and critiqued in previous chapters. As I have shown, such references can be 
both contextual and outwardly influential, as was the case with early bodybuilding standards and 
Western body ideals. However, the remaining issue with using “measuring sticks” as the type of 
reference point we seek is that it does not provide any elements of an intercontextual <natural> 
that can help guide action that guards against particular unjust uses of <natural>. 
For this type of protection, and also to understand the ideological power of <natural>, a 
more expansive reference for the word becomes necessary. Hausman and Kennedy (1975) 
explain there are two roots for our current use of <natural>, but both “are focused on man [sic] 
and his [sic] condition” (p. 93). The authors describe the two roots as fatalism and determinism, 
both of which involve specific understandings relating to eventual purpose and future. In 
Hausman and Kennedy’s definition, determinism is the belief that for any given event there 
exists a set of conditions that, if repeated, would also repeat the event. Fatalism is the contention 
that human choice and action are entirely irrelevant to the course of events. 	
These approaches are often the basis of very different philosophies and even theologies, 
but they share a particular thread that connects ideas about what <natural> comprises and may 
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offer us our philosophical reference. Hausman and Kennedy (1975) surmise that the basic 
premise of naturalness extends to our assumptions about the universe. There is a generally shared 
belief that there is a universal flow of things, temporal or otherwise, that is widely referred to as 
“the course of nature” (p. 96). There are many incarnations of this course across and within 
cultures, but the most basic premise remains similar: a chain of happenings will occur and has 
occurred up to now. Whether a person believes this course is predetermined by a guiding force or 
represents a type of evolutionary eventuality will largely shape their perception of the 
importance of this “course.” If the course is predetermined, we are again working from an 
Aristotelian teleological view of things: Whatever is happening is doing so because this is what 
is required to meet the always-existing eventual ends. The alternate view is causal; as a result of 
these occurrences, this is what must result.  
From either of these given perspectives, the course, or a theoretical original course, 
represents the “course of nature” we seem to hear about so often. Here I have detailed a rather 
simple philosophy, but this elementary element is important to recognize: Things happen as they 
are supposed to (or were intended to) until for some reason, they do not. Each of these prescribed 
or expected happenings is <natural> and has its place so long as probabilities are met. The 
unnatural must then be understood as undue interference or manipulation of this course. In such a 
dichotomous understanding, anything that deviates from the course is a subversion of nature and 
disrupts the flow. Such things are often considered in unhappy terms. Of course, to project such a 
flow assumes a temporal universe with a generally understood course of direction. If there was 
no recognizable change, and the universe remained wholly static, nothing unnatural (from this 
definition) could happen, as there would be no changes in course. Out of this line of logic, one 
could rightly assess that “the unnatural” is also the very catalyst of change (or becoming) that 
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interrupts a given condition or striation. This is an important realization and one that props up 
arguments about the unnatural body being a conduit of becoming.  
 Still, the question remains, what exactly is the direction and substance of this flow? 
Certainly there is no end to answers, but a few possibilities are worth assessing. Some might 
view the course of nature as a movement from less complexity toward more intricacy, a type of 
evolutionary advancement. Another perspective would presume greater understanding and 
intelligence of our world and universe across time. Some may view biological balance and 
population stability as ends, or perhaps the completion of God’s will and fulfillment of His 
kingdom on earth. Astrophysicists discuss the eventual energy death of the universe as a long-
term progression towards nothingness. A socially concerned viewpoint might consider the 
<natural> order as a progression towards a less violent future from a bloody past. Whatever the 
perspective, there is a shared accounting for an extrapolation of past events inviting future 
prognosis. Such expectations define the <natural> as events that align with the larger process and 
that are a part of the understood “patterned progression” (Hausman & Kennedy, 1975, p. 98).  
 It has already been said that interference with such a <natural> order would be a plausible 
definition for the unnatural. However, there are also interpretations that muddy this and bring 
back into question our understanding of this interference. For example, the appearance of a 
deadly virus that threatens all life could conceivably “naturally” occur under the definition of 
“not purposefully created.” Lack of interference, allowing the <natural> course to continue, 
would result in the eradication of life on a large scale. This sudden end would destroy any 
number of interpretations of <natural> courses. Humanity would not socially progress, violence 
does not cease, and biological complexity is only diminished. However, other depictions of the 
course might view this as entirely akin to the progression of time, and a mechanism for bringing 
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balance to the planet. If a method of combating the virus was created, order could be restored 
through many definitions. In this case, interference preserves a <natural> order. This engages a 
definitional question for unnaturalness: is interference in a non-forecasted process unnatural 
action, or was this a force of preservation for the <natural> order that offered rescue from an 
unnatural virus? This decision hinges on how the virus is interpreted, and whether this even falls 
within a paradigmatic <natural> order of human physiological well-being.  
Of course such a question, like many others I have presented thus far, is largely 
unanswerable without first deciding the philosophical starting point on which such conclusions 
would be formed. However, this is precisely the value in this exercise of questioning, as this 
abstract play is turned back to our particular contexts. An unmasking of this philosophical 
grounding for pronouncements of <natural> or unnatural, removes mysticism from the process, 
and offers accountability back to the decider. Entrenched schema without recognizable reference 
would no longer provide adequate grounds for pronouncement. Even without agreement on what 
the “flow” of <natural> order is, acknowledgment that such decisions relating to naturalness are 
based on a particular engagement of this idea allows some common thread towards discussion of 
reformulation of the ideograph. Specifically applied to our context, we can ask: “What sort of 
<natural> course are we assuming when we choose to consider chemically enhanced bodies as 
unnatural?” Is it that we believe the course of humanity is to avoid contact with particular 
substances? Could it be that a vision of <natural> order involves not developing beyond a certain 
size or musculature unfamiliar to our immediate history? Is it possible that our concern with the 
potential redefinition of human possibility might forcibly influence how we perceive the human 
“kind?” Confronting these inquiries restores a certain amount of agency to a discussion that is 
often based in longstanding convention and expired references. It is always difficult to tangibly 
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connect the overarching elements of an ideograph, as their power exists partially through their 
ambiguity. However, for there to be the near universal appeal for a terminology, some level of 
connectedness must exist. If a theoretical <natural> course is taken up as our point of 
convergence in this discussion, one of our considerations for the deployment of a more 
considerate ideographic <natural> is at least partially met. In the following section I will discuss 
the next listed consideration, the utility of the word. 
Utility of <Natural> and Natural Law 
 Though it is far from perfect, a <natural> “course” or “flow” allows for some 
convergence in discussions of the otherwise ambiguous ideograph and its implications. Here we 
can, at least, be mostly assured that there is some measure of common ground. The next facet of 
consideration before deployment of a more responsible <natural> based on tenets of a “natural 
construct” revolves around the specific utility of the word choice. There are several elements to 
consider within language choice. Primary among these elements is the past usage and historicity 
of the word. In the early chapters of this study, this was my particular focus. Over time, 
<natural> has been used as a locus of control over particular modes of existence, and has also 
been used in exclusionary language. Within bodybuilding, the use of <natural> has shown the 
capacity to definitively divide particular bodies between lines of naturalness and produce 
conventions for bodily standards. This usage is one of the primary justifications for this study. If 
investigation stops here, and only the violent capacity of <natural> is considered, it would seem 
that any utility the word may hold would be largely nullified. However, the ingrained character 
of <natural>, like most ideographs, means that it is at best unlikely, and more realistically 
impossible to eliminate the language fully from our collective vocabularies. Even if it could be 
procured, such action would also dismiss the potentials of a word that has demonstrated the 
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capability to motivate and mobilize, even if many instances of this power’s use have been unjust 
in the past. 
 The options left to us, then, involve understanding both the theoretical and specific utility 
of using a word that can guide our strategic action. Why does this particular term hold influence, 
and how/when can it be responsibly employed? One way to envision this use is to purposefully 
separate the referent course or flow of <natural> from the connotative features that follow. This 
process involves detaching those things that generally happen from those things that require 
some sort of agreement for its occurrence. To do this, we must actively decide to what extent 
<natural> refers to what does happen, or whether it is only being employed as a normative force 
(Trigg, 2005). This perspective would force us to confront questions like: “is it <natural> for 
some humans/bodies to thrive more than others, or have our expectations merely normalized its 
occurrence?”  
Making this distinction is, to some extent, an anti-instinctual process to undertake as it is 
especially easy to extrapolate what “always” happens as part of a <natural> flow, even if this 
happening is only local in significance (both physically and temporally). After all, our existence 
as natural constructs is dependent on experience and shared experiences that accompany 
material reality. However, what appears to be, and is often described as, <natural> is often little 
more than the proficiently familiar. Conversely, something that defies the convention of the 
readily familiar is very likely to be classified as unnatural. Thus, the way <natural> is often used 
is not really connected to the reference point of a continuous flow. In fact, it is quite likely that 
such uses of <natural> “may not have much to do with the character of the world” (Trigg, 2005, 
p. 13) at all, but arise out a of a peculiar will to segregate. This type of undue deployment of 
<natural> theoretically strips the term of ethical authority through its appearance in continuous 
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“crying wolf” scenarios. Pronouncing each regularity as fully attributable to static nature, 
muddies our ability to determine what is and is not essential. When we quickly apply a label of 
<natural> to a set of expected experiences, we make the mistake of deriving what ought to 
happen from what is currently happening. In doing so we impose a limited contextual viewpoint 
on an undecided future and an inappropriately expansive jurisdiction. This type of action both 
narrows the potential of what <natural> can be, and too broadly projects the (often incorrect) 
determinations that are made. 
 Our material world does certainly have its regularities, but these regularities are not 
wholly predictable by humans, and their causes and changes are not always predictably 
managed. This has not stopped humans from attempting to undertake this process of determining 
the constitutive elements of the <natural> flow. At different times, this has resulted in cultural 
imperatives to justify particular understandings of the world. Among these were/are the 
willingness to accept the <natural> inferiority of women, and the <natural> order involved in 
humans owning other humans as property. These atrocities are directly tied to the ways in which 
<natural> as both an abstract term and a symbolic referent was pursued and reified by a 
particular authority. However, in a move that may at first appear as contrary to much of this 
study, I must pause my indictment of our present and historical uses of <natural> in order to 
fairly discuss the term’s utility.  
This discussion becomes necessary for two primary reasons. First, when we refuse to 
investigate any organizing properties of a <natural> order, and if we operate under the 
assumption that no such thing exists, we do not free ourselves from the existence of a normative 
naturalness, we only move its location and name. Second, by casting out all assumptions relating 
to naturalness, we instead impose a depiction of a different <natural> order, a paradoxical 
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insistence on a static (<natural>) state of the world where naturalness cannot exist. Such a world 
without transfer and change would exist outside the realm of sharable experience, and would rely 
totally on the experience of individuals to provide themselves direction. This perspective yields 
indelible consequences in much the same way impositions of <natural> do. Instead of imposing a 
morality set justified through the use of an authoritative <natural>, we instead elect to deny the 
existence of any far-reaching, sharable morality. Without this resource, we lack the capacity to 
collectively indict the very violent practices that <natural> would otherwise be accountable for. 
We make the inadvisable trade of common interest for individualized whims. Some agreement 
must linger here if change is to be successfully hoped for. 
 It can be accurately claimed that I am now asking for much from a particular word. On 
one hand I wish to free terminology from its violent, normative tendencies. On the other, I 
require that <natural> retain properties of collectiveness so we might be allowed to make 
changes necessary to the way we use ideographic language. This is difficult theoretical ground to 
tread, but I believe the considerations involved in making <natural> into a “natural construct” 
allow us to at least tenuously travel on this ground. I also believe alternatives already exist 
(although imperfectly) within our existing vocabulary that have reference to both naturalness and 
shared moral purpose. One such alternative is the theoretical existence of natural law, or the 
supposed guiding principles for what happens, or should happen, with or without the application 
of human negotiation. Like the flow or course of nature referred to before, there are certainly 
many understandings to explore of what natural law entails. Many of these perspectives are 
nearly indistinguishable from the ideas of a <natural> course. Such perspectives understand 
natural law to govern the world in a prescriptive manner, suggesting that all events play out in 
patterns of cause and effect that are observable, and with the correct perspective, predictable. 
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Another widely held perspective, the one I wish to confront here, is that there is an innate order 
to the <natural> world that governs morality, and our ideas of appropriate action. These 
supposed irrevocable “ten commandments” of nature encompass much of the moral logic for our 
basic laws, governance, and regulatory behavior. 
 Of course, natural law is a discipline of study in its own right. There are entire treatises 
on the subject in several philosophical eras from Plato to Hobbes, Augustine, Calvin, Hume and 
many more. There are also countless biological and sociological studies done on both humans 
and animals. One recognizable study on this topic was done by de Waal (2002), who looked at 
great apes for insights into a history of an evolutionary moral development. He wrote that there 
seems to be some recognition for moral behavior beyond just survival for the animals, and that it 
might be heavily socialized to the point where it only appears to be innate. For much of 
humanity, natural law (sometimes read as equivalent to God’s law) was sought out as a type of 
roadmap for human activity. Operating under this premise, correct human activity involved 
finding out the task we were meant for, and then accomplishing it in the way we were purposed. 
Natural law carried a moral force that governed through referent power traceable back to 
whichever human origin story or theology most resonated. Certainly many of these elements still 
exist in modern theology and also, to an extent, in metaphysics. However, as modern science has 
carved away at many of our ancient teleological beliefs about prescribed purpose and 
predestination, natural law has somewhat diminished in both scope and in its ties to moral 
behavior. Neo-Darwinist thinking has melded with beliefs about natural law in a way that 
presumes a natural order to be violent, genetically motivated, and in many ways contrary to 
much of what human law now exists to protect. Natural law is now mostly thought of as the 
evolutionary pecking order that provides odds for or against our survival chances. In this school 
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of thought, natural law is at best morally neutral and merely describes regularities in a non-
purposive way. It is beyond the scope of this study to pursue every angle of perspective 
surrounding natural law, but I believe there are alternative views on the topic which incorporate 
well with our vision of natural constructs of ideographic naturalness. 
 To gain a useful perspective on natural law, we must again displace, or suspend, the 
dualism associated with natural law for a more reasoned account of the term’s usefulness. The 
scientific, Neo-Darwinian procurement of natural law does little to describe the processes of 
human life. Humans are not entirely programmed by biology, and even if we were, acceptance of 
this fate would forfeit all human agencies and make morality a moot consideration. Even so, 
human freedom cannot rightly be considered absolute. There are costs to be paid whenever 
certain preferences are railroaded within a particular context in favor of immediate satisfaction. 
There is some basic level of agreement on which of these costs are acceptable and which 
overstep seemed boundaries. Murphy (2001) refers to these agreements as “fundamental reasons 
and certain goods that are grounded in the nature of human beings.” (p. 2). To make any type of 
moral or social progress, we must first accept the loose existence of this “nature.” However, this 
nature contains the potential to become problematic whenever we attempt to describe it as a 
static state, and striate it within an apparatus of capture. When we undertake this striation, we 
mistakenly grant something useful in thought or as guidance a place as foundational cannon. 
Certain things are against human interests, but our method of deriving this is often flawed. For 
example, flawed methodology manifests in striations like legislation in two primary ways: 1. 
laws no longer represent the social, political or economic climate of the context they are now 
applied to, but the policy remains due to force of tradition; or 2. A measure has a “backfire” 
effect despite good intention. An instance of this second type of misapplication can be found in 
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measures like the Child Labor Act of 1986. Though this action legally banned child labor in 
India, the legislation has been shown to have increased the amount of child labor and decreased 
the wages of child workers (Bharadwaj, Lakdawala, & Li, 2013). Although it is likely in larger 
human interest to dissuade usage of child labor, the application of the new striation did not 
produce this result. This does not mean the measure itself was unethical or inconsistent with a 
moral “natural flow,” but rather it means that the method of enforcement was inadequate for the 
climate in which it was applied. 
Discourse about natural law often gravitates towards grandiose, overarching 
pronouncements of good and evil. These depictions most often claim their origins in untouchable 
places such as the mind of philosophers, the Will of God, inherent to nature, or some 
combination of these locations (Hittinger, 2003). By framing the discourse around natural law in 
this way, we are granting authority to a method of thinking that is difficult to revoke. Hittinger 
suggests it is not necessary to grant this type of power to this terminology, and that doing so 
takes away greatly from the real utility of natural law. To him, natural law constitutes (or should 
constitute) an “authority-free zone” (p. xii). This dispersion of authority is accomplished not by 
granting credence to an authority assumed to purvey natural law (God, nature, tradition, etc.), but 
instead by allowing the very existence of the social agreement to serve as guidance. Whether or 
not a supreme force exists, there needn’t be an appeal to an outward authority in order to 
determine the essential and acceptable characteristics of humans. This is a very democratic 
viewpoint on the surface, but it is one with a core, requiring both recognition of a material, 
<natural> reality and the acceptance of non-necessity in our current interpretation of that reality. 
It also requires an aggressively progressive view of natural law. If natural law is that which best 
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describes and guides responsible human actions, then it must also be responsive to changes in 
what we know about human capability as well as humanity’s current condition.  
 Natural law should not be confused with how humans are naturally inclined to behave if 
we have hope that it can describe some sort of moral platitude. Many of our so-called <natural> 
tendencies have proven to be far from conducive to the best interests of humanity. Human 
nature, like a supposed natural course, must continue in perpetual ambiguity if we are to ever 
find use of the term. What is conducive to human’s nature is not necessarily what we most 
readily recognize, nor does it always pre-exist in our human convention (Trigg, 2005). 
Recognition of required action is often in direct conflict with what is easiest to do, also. 
Humanity has proven to be its own worst enemy at various times across our existence and neither 
authoritarian rules nor the individualistic pursuits of people have proven to offer adequate 
provisional guidance. If natural order is accepted as simply the path of least resistance, there is 
little hope for the social progression of humanity. Proper guidance requires re-evaluation of 
existing standards, and the willingness and reasonability to adapt these standards when new 
information comes to light, or when previous measures no longer adequately account for a 
changing social scene. Herein lies the utility of <natural> broadly reasoned: it offers a connective 
thread toward discussions of reasonable human action, and issues a non-authoritarian reference 
that can be used as guidance and can also be rearticulated. Natural law, when thought of as 
grounded, reasonable basis of action, provides guidance out of a smooth space. It is free from 
prescriptive-style dealings with change, and yet instills a prerogative toward justice. In doing so, 
the concepts of <natural>, and natural law, at least exhibit potentials beyond nefarious uses. This 
theoretical ground carved out by reconstructing the terms shows that it is possible to undertake 
our second consideration for the use of <natural> (evaluating its utility) and still find its use 
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productive. <Natural> can be utilized responsibly. This certainly does not mean that it has been 
or will be. 
Conclusion: Consequences of <natural> 
 The previous two sections have carved theoretical space for the reclamation of <natural> 
for means beyond its current use. It is shown that our current definitional standards are not a 
requirement of the current paradigm and that there are ways to re-imagine the term’s possibility. 
This theoretical play is important, as unlearning oppressive behaviors often requires some type of 
displacement of the old. It is even possible to find common ground across debates about 
naturalness that can lead to better acceptance of difference and change. However, simply noting 
that <natural> can be reclaimed does not mean that it has been, or that it even is progressing in 
that direction. Prior experience tells us that, when exposed to apparatuses of capture, spaces tend 
to become more striated over time, rather than smoother. This particular consideration is where 
pragmatic dealing with real usages of <natural> must regain center stage, and marks the 
culpability of individuals in any movement or redirection of the term’s clout.  
Before responsible usage of the term <natural>, it must first be determined that both the 
reference and the utility of the usage are recognized, and then the rhetor must acknowledge 
whose perspective is being reified though the employment of the ideographic power of the term. 
The same choice of language can combine any number of results for the three considerations. For 
example using <natural> within an argument promoting traditional heterosexual marriage 
invokes a static and authoritarian view on the topic and reifies a perspective that is harmful to 
particular groups. Meanwhile, using <natural> to reassure a youth struggling with questions 
about their sexuality accomplishes a completely opposite set of results. It still refers to a 
particular course of things, but doesn’t claim deference to a particular authority for the sake of an 
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easy answer. Instead, the use is lodged within an evidence of experience and progress, and is 
employed to care for pain and/or promote understanding. These are two fairly straightforward 
examples, but if we were to delve deeper, there are instances where helpful/not helpful is not 
such an easy distinction. If we consider the example of a person explaining the abusive behavior 
of their child as <natural> because “boys will be boys,” the immediate utility is helpfulness in 
the sense that it is used to protect the child. However, this use of <natural> reifies problematic 
gender roles, justifies violence, and consults the authority of an assumed binary. Again, those 
with a particular social awareness might be quick to recognize this instance as one where the 
utility does not usurp the reference or historicity of the term. 
As a final example, I wish to offer a scenario specifically applicable to the context of this 
study. Consider a public service message that encourages a population to avoid steroid use 
because it is unnatural, makes people look unnatural, and could do long term harm to their 
bodies. This information is largely evidentially backed; many studies suggest that irresponsible 
AAS use can be harmful. The statement also offers the utility of preventing injury and ridicule to 
a significant population. However, this statement also reifies particular long-standing 
assumptions about the human body and its associated expectations. If we apply the list of 
considerations to this particular scenario, we are left asking whether this reification of bodily 
norms is essentially more helpful or harmful. Even if we are decidedly against the use of steroids 
because of harm we have observed them to produce, we must consider that such a statement 
refers to a particular authority on the articulation of a human body, one that is not necessitated by 
existential requirements but that exists out of convention. This is an instance where a rhetor must 
take deliberate thought on the language choice and decide if it properly meets the standards of a 
justifiable use. Is this convention worth supporting because of the harm it might prevent? In 
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answering this question I decide what statement to make about the “course of nature,” and I must 
also confront my place in it.   
 Decisions that involve justification of word choice become an important battleground in 
the forging of any ideograph’s future. The importance is amplified when we wish to overhaul a 
long period of connotation and convention and create something different than what we have 
historically experienced. <Natural> can use its rhetorical power to ease pain instead of create it 
and promote progress instead of halting it, but only if and when its usage is directly associated 
with that purpose. Surely, plenty of the responsibility lies within each individual rhetor who must 
constantly consider the impacts of their language. If we are to claim more moralistic use of 
language as a possibility, however, we must also accept a larger theoretical shift around how we 
use and understand <natural> that likely extends to other ideographs as well. If we are looking to 
a different vision of natural law to provide the guidance that individual whims cannot, we must 
involve ample consideration of the type of <natural> world we wish to create. In the final chapter 
of this study, I continue to confront the third consideration of a less violent <natural> in a more 
theoretically nuanced and generalizeable way. I do this work by investigating the consequences 
involved in the reification of particular visions for the term, and I conclude with an advisement 
toward how communicators, and especially communication scholars, can rhetorically approach 
the striation of ideographs. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS: TOWARD A “MACHINIC” DEPLOYMENT OF IDEOGRAPHS 
Introduction/Review 
 Throughout this study I have called attention to the places where an ideographic 
<natural> has “crystallized” within regulatory language and, in doing so, has created a device for 
the striation and categorization of bodies and practices. Using the world of bodybuilding as an 
exemplar, I have foregrounded the ethical and moral compromises that defining <natural> often 
seems to require. I also pointed to specific instances where an ideologically weighty <natural> 
has been employed to privilege a particular group over another and, in turn, caused harm. There 
was sufficient evidence to show that <natural> is both a particularly influential ideograph, and 
that its uses are not always grounded in ethical responsibility. From this point, I turned to 
examine the theoretical progression involved in crystallization of the terminology, as well as the 
process of selecting the particular word <natural> for use in regulatory language. Through the 
vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), I depicted the ways <natural> has been striated by an 
apparatus of capture to divergent effect. I pointed to the ways these authors illustrate that smooth 
and striated places can interact to create new areas of thought and application. In applying this 
vocabulary to ideographic striation, I offered the possibility of productive and responsible 
change to our current iterations of <natural>. 
In the previous chapter, I explored a theoretical advisement for reclaiming the given 
power of <natural> in ways that have the potential to promote healing and justice. In this 
advisement, I offered three considerations for outlining the use of the terminology: First, the 
symbolic reference of <natural> must be considered (What am I invoking when I say 
<natural>?). Second, the utility of the term must be measured (What am I using the ideographic 
power of the word to accomplish?). Finally, an assessment must be made concerning the 
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consequences involved in reifying the language in the particular way chosen. In this final 
chapter, I close by focusing on these considerations collectively with a particular mind to the 
third. How do we approach the contested meanings of <natural> responsibly without creating the 
type of regulation that stabilizes power within a particular domain? I believe this action is 
possible through the application of a profound but simple existing theoretical approach that has 
an eye on both context and potentiality.  
Instruments and Machines 
Contested understandings of <natural> exist as arenas for resistance, reclamation, and 
potential problem. Rarely are large-scale praises or indictments of the term’s usage fully possible 
(though situationally, such judgments may become possible). Even through commitments to 
more responsible usage of ideographs, defining “proper” usage is still quite difficult. In earlier 
chapters I looked into the prescriptive and descriptive ways that bodybuilding has used <natural> 
to serve the purpose of striating bodies. Bodybuilding, as a practice, has had significant impact 
on which iterations of human form are acceptable, healthy, and most perfectly developed. Within 
organized divisions of bodybuilding, the ideograph has been used to create (often ambiguous and 
semi-enforceable) standards for what can be considered the correct chemical makeup of a 
<natural> human.    
In using the context of bodybuilding, we are provided with an adequate example of the 
double-edged character of <natural>’s usage: Consider a new striation of <natural> concerning 
AAS and like substances that is legally dictated to define which substances should not be taken 
by bodies who wish to remain considered <natural>, in sport or otherwise. Such a measure may 
be fairly effective at discouraging some youths from harming their organs and shortening their 
life spans with potentially dangerous substances. As we become more familiar with the side 
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effects of substances, perhaps the definition set forth by a governing body shifts to include 
certain supplementation behaviors or training activities that are sufficiently dangerous. The 
number of overdoses and tissue injuries might decrease by an observable amount and this would, 
of course, be considered a productive development.  
On the other hand, any desire for the utility of this formalization of <natural> must be 
tempered to recognize the potential of such striations to harm through their precedence. If youths 
are deemed unnatural through simple pharmaceutical or supplement usage, little is done to 
rectify the cultural forces that drove the use of the substances in the first place (culture of 
competition, negative self-worth, sexual/peer pressure, desire for otherwise impossible progress, 
etc.). Instead, a person who obtains the usually unshakable label of unnatural likely will have less 
incentive to readjust any dangerous behavior. If my body is unredeemably unnatural, and I 
cannot repair this status, why should I continue to adhere to a code that categorically relegates 
me to a lower level of bodily existence? There is certainly utility in using <natural> in this way, 
but the precedence it creates makes this action somewhat self-defeating in many scenarios. The 
historicity and lasting character of the <natural>/unnatural dichotomy must be continually 
recognized in decision processes that involve sufficient scope, less the violent potential of 
<natural> return in new form.  
If <natural> were to be reclaimed or disbursed in a way that allowed the dualism 
involved between natural/unnatural to be blurred, perhaps the distinction of bodily unnaturalness 
would no longer carry the full weight of judgment. However, without this deterrent, all purpose 
for the regulation would likely be lost as well. Neither adding <natural> to regulatory language, 
or outright removing it allows us a safe place of easy-mindedness toward the subject. Constant 
re/evaluation of all language use is important, but the significance is magnified in discussions of 
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ideographs because of the rhetorical significance they are granted. Adherence to a cycle of 
awareness and appraisal is a tall task, but it is likely a necessary one if responsible language use 
is indeed our goal: Is this language choice responsible? What ends does it serve? The indecision 
that comes with carrying multiple considerations for the use of <natural> within each and every 
context is difficult. Such a task can be read as the type of call to action that leads an otherwise 
concerned individual down a path of inaction. This inaction, of course, continues toward 
repetition of a problematic status quo. If every language choice becomes so largely 
consequential, it perhaps seems difficult to communicate at all. After all, are the answers to the 
given considerations even knowable? Even if I am committed to near constant attention, isn’t it 
possible that I still “do <natural>” wrong? Through these questions we hear the echoes of those 
who fear a culture steeped too deeply in “political correctness.” Regardless, an attitudinal shift 
must occur for significant change in the usage of <natural> to be found. The given options of 
approaching <natural> appear to be somewhat of a paradox in practice, but they do not have to 
be. 
Here I hope to successfully apply to ideographs what Coonfield (2006) calls a “machinic 
understanding” juxtaposed to the “instrumental” way concepts are often deployed. Coonfield 
suggests that we spend far too much time asking, “What IS it?” (in relation to a word, concept, or 
even tangible items) and in doing so, we “thus delineate everything in advance of the answer” (p. 
297). In Coonfield’s estimation, we spend an undue amount of energy asking what something 
is/should be for and what its intended purpose is before ever giving it a chance to expand its 
utility in practice. Coonfield uses the actions showcased in the many movies of actor Jackie Chan 
as a vivid example. Whenever Chan is put in a difficult situation, he observes his surroundings in 
a new and advanced way. Objects are no longer limited to their “intended purpose.” Instead, 
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Chan has the unique ability to re-imagine and “machine” items so they combine with him to fit 
the purpose and needs of his given context. This way, a lobster becomes more than a potential 
meal, it is a way of fending off a knife-wielding attacker. Similarly a rake isn’t just a landscaping 
tool, it is the perfect item to use to vault out of an open window before the explosion occurs. 
Chan’s ripe awareness, and capacity for escaping apparent limitations appears to be a type of 
super power, but it does not involve anything supernatural at all. No longer just instruments, 
these ordinary items he finds interact with Chan to become part of a “machine” that can 
accomplish more than what could be imagined for the item alone or the actor by himself.  
Instrumental versus Machinic is a modern terminology, but shares a very similar 
philosophy to that of Thomas Aquinas’ theory of existence vs. essence. Through Aquinas’ 
understanding, anything that we have formed a conception of can be said to “exist” in the sense 
that it is contained within our world of reason. If we refer to it, we have created some form for its 
entry into our plane of existence, no matter whether it is material, philosophical, literary, or 
allegorical. However, the esse of the thing, or its actualization of potency, is what determines for 
Aquinas what the thing “really is.” To determine the esse of a concept, you must linger in what it 
does and what it can be used to accomplish. If the work of reasoning ends at acceptance or non-
acceptance that a concept exists, our logic for belief slips into problematic circular, self-
referential thinking. This is the type of reasoning that leads to literal and figurative “witch 
hunts.” The reasoning plays out under this progression:  
1. An evil exists because linguistic authority/tradition declares its existence. 
2. Anything we declare to dwell within the realm of this existence is also evil by  
association.  
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3. Our continued pursuit of this evil maintains its existence and extends its 
applications.  
We can see quite easily how this might apply to instances of ideographs entering 
regulatory language. A divide is created within ambiguous language; legislation is created that 
further fosters this divide and captures the newly formed differential; and continued, non-
substantiated use of the captured terminology ensures that the divide perpetuates. For <natural> 
to actualize its conceptual existence, it must have a recognized purpose. Whether this purpose is 
instrumental or machinic is determined by the ways we employ the ideographic power we have 
already created within the terminology we now use. This is where the necessity for responsible 
language use returns (Goodwin, 1965). 
In our context, we too often “instrumentalize” <natural> in static ways through our 
regulatory behavior. This action prevents the word from being considered in anything other than 
already-existing modes of dialogue. Acting in this way severely limits the ideograph’s scope of 
potential to only places and methods where it is already been shown to have use. Based on the 
history of employment of <natural>, this would likely doom its usage only to places where it 
continues to standardize and discriminate between bodies, either directly or indirectly. Coonfield 
(2006) argues, instead, that responsible use of language and theory always works to move the 
instrumental toward the machinic and asks, “Of what is it capable? With what else does or can it 
connect?” (p. 298). In considering the capacity of <natural> in specific, contextual relationships 
with bodies, we perform a much different action than when we impose the word on the bodies. 
Considering possibilities of application instead of labeling turns focus toward potentials and not 
categories. What <natural> can do is realized as the “function of its capabilities under particular 
conditions as it enters into relations of composition/decomposition with other bodies” (p. 296). 
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Shortly, what to do with <natural> must become far more important than what, exactly, 
<natural> means if we are ever to unlock its more ethical uses. 
For communication scholars and rhetoricians, it is part of our calling to investigate the 
places where language is especially impactful. We share a belief in the power of the symbolic 
word and we research, teach, and mentor others so that the power associated with 
communication might be administrated more justly. In recognition of this commitment, we 
should then be particularly interested in the places where considerable communicative power 
resides. In this case, responding to our educational calling involves seeing that constructions of 
<natural>, or other ideographs, are not limited to what “it is” now or even for what (or for 
whom) it was intended. Within the process of teaching and learning responsible language use, we 
shape the esse of the influential concepts we discuss. Failing to do so allows the circular logical 
patterns that ensnare bodies in harmful ways. Those of us in the communication discipline cling 
to a mantra that says, “Communication is consequential.” For this belief to be realized in 
practice, we are required to go beyond simply relaying the existence of terminologies to a place 
where our purpose is helping “machine” these terminologies responsibly. We must search for the 
productive, liberating potential embedded within the ideographic power attached to words. In 
this search lies hope for an agency that looks forward and also does not require a total 
dismantling of, or a return to, past deployments of ideographs. We cannot cause <natural> to 
reach non-existence through our criticism, language practices, or even through renewed 
attention. However, we can locate machinic usages for <natural> that mold its purpose, its esse, 
into new actualization. 
More specifically, taking a machinic approach means that we must examine the potential 
of <natural>, not as a definitive state of being (as it has been deployed), but as an ideographical 
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springboard of potential that will come into relation with peculiar contexts, non-dominant 
practices, and bodies of different capabilities. There are endless applications of this thought 
process and many of them provide options that exceed the scope of past usage. Returning to our 
extended example within the context of this study provides an opportunity for application. 
Through this machinic lens, bodybuilders could participate in seemingly unnatural actions as 
they relate to AAS and other performance-enhancing substances, but still be understood as 
important, <natural> variances of bodily experience. The behavior is not necessarily encouraged, 
as it rubs up against a shared ethic of public health, but the person is also appreciated for their 
impact on the growth of human possibility. The individual, and especially their variance in 
bodily performance, has a place in the “flow” that is the <natural> progression of things. Each 
innovator and marker of difference expands understandings of human potential. This approach 
paves the way for a larger appreciation of what humans can be and re-evaluation of our 
constructions relating to what we “should” be. Further, all types of bodies reside within a shared 
<natural> flow, even if the descriptor <natural> must mean different things in relation to each 
body. The measuring stick that evaluates the individual can be drastically different even under 
the larger guidance of a shared moral/ethical commitment that comprises a reformed “natural 
law.” I believe, by taking this perspective, it is possible for a body to both stretch understanding 
of human capability, and still matter individually.  
The striations of <natural> have produced a high degree of variance in their outcomes. 
Certainly there are instances where the overall results of regulatory implementations have been 
good. However, the more severe consequences have been highlighted within the pages of this 
study for a reason: They best showcase the far-reaching effects of large-scale ideographic 
regulation. We would hope that results like the Indian Removal Act that used <natural> to decide 
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who was fit to belong in a certain land would not be repeated, but there is reason to believe we 
are not free from this usage. The requirements of “naturalization” laws are still codified in ways 
that make it easier to detain, arrest, and deport non-white residents. This is especially true in 
southwestern states that give police forces the right to detain “anyone suspicious.” Arizona 
specifically has a stated goal of “attrition through enforcement,” in order to “make life so 
difficult for undocumented immigrants—and their unwanted ‘networks of relatives, friends, and 
countrymen’ that they will all leave the state” (Guttentag, 2012). Obviously this is an intentional 
impediment to avoid allowing these inhabitants to achieve naturalization through the outlined 
(but heavily contested) five-year residency protocol. Being <natural>ized still is immensely 
legally consequential. Access to basic civil rights can hinge on which side of the designation a 
person is allowed. It is not difficult to find ways where the terminology still striates bodies, and it 
is unlikely to be brought to a full-stop under <natural>’s current regime of usage. 
<Natural>’s implementation may hold difficult consequences, but like our consideration 
of <natural> law in the previous chapter, the consequences are not required in a fatalistic way. 
What if, instead of focusing on the striations that have been, we instead continue to ask, like 
Coonfield, “what can [<natural>] do?” I contend that in answering this question the terminology 
is afforded a chance to “become” in a way that only the newly created smooth space can allow. 
For <natural> to be anything other than a categorical qualifier, it must expand beyond the 
territories and definitions already in use. “Becoming,” in the understanding shared with Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987), allows the word to transform into something it was not envisioned as 
before. Such becoming requires us to ask questions that break the basic categorizing principles of 
the word down to its “essential elements.” These types of inquiries interrogate where the value 
for <natural> or any other ideograph has arisen, and what it is now doing. It leads to questions 
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about why the borders around naturalness are located where they are and about consequences 
that may arise from their deployment: When I place the borders of <natural> here, who am I 
cutting off, and who am I working to benefit? This type of becoming allows for works such as 
this study that critique any and every understanding of <natural> that claims to be self-
referentially <natural>.  
This genre of work implores audiences to explore the affective and intensive potentials of 
an ideograph to ask how they might be re-organized or even disorganized to foster a more just 
and usable platform for human action. The language and the people who use it shape each other 
continually. Our recognition and responsible integration of this knowledge determines what we 
will do with the symbolic power granted to the ideographs we have already created. Certainly 
endless potential for new becomings of the word exist if we choose to shoulder the burden of 
fostering the becoming through machining practices. Much of this study pointed out where 
bodies have been deemed unnatural. If we take this as a starting point, we elect the challenge of 
reformulating our ideographic language. This means we ask questions like: What if “unnatural” 
bodies were instead understood as a fleshed critique of the assumed <natural> body? If we 
continue on this pursuit we would find innumerable modes of expansion, such as a productive 
intersection of rhetorical studies and disability studies. Here is a machinic point of convergence 
where our assumptions about naturalness can dissolve and are reformed. We “machine” both 
realms of study towards a synergistic usage that might not be in either’s immediate description. 
People and bodies that fit within the former descriptor of “unnatural” might then become 
recognized as dynamic conduits of becoming and appreciated both for the individual’s unique 
experience and also for their importance within a constant movement of human development. 
This would also bring into light the places where the markers of difference have produced 
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marginalizing effects on the “different” bodies. In this “machine,” difference is not ignored, but 
it is not subjugated to a place beneath a separate <natural> order. Instead the <natural> order is 
forcibly reconstructed so that it can better accommodate for a population once intentionally 
removed from its jurisdiction. Meanwhile, forced inclusion into any designation can be limiting 
to the expanse of human potential and, in doing so, return the language to a place of harmful 
striation. For this reason, it is possible that machining the ideograph might also mean opening 
<natural> to critiques of exclusivity or valorizing iterations of unnatural instead of dissolving 
them within a more inclusive category. For any route to be successful in reformulating 
<natural>, however, the word must come to mean something other than a discriminating force; it 
must be machined to do something different than its adopted purpose within our apparatus of 
capture. 
When this machinic approach to <natural> becomes a part of reflexive and responsible 
language use, challenges within our own bodily experience gain a new platitude of purpose 
within a now-unsettled <natural> flow. For example, I live life through a body that experiences 
an anxiety condition. It is at times negligible or even beneficial to my pursuits, and at other times 
it is extremely limiting. Though this type of bodily experience is not uncommon, it exists within 
a construct of non-normal. Conventionally, there is something unnatural about the way my body 
emotionally processes certain phenomena. My entries into the world of bodybuilding (I still 
prefer the term weight-lifting for myself) and academia offer fleshed critique of places where I 
do not necessarily assume the profile for full entry (as small as this critique might appear).  The 
esse of these systems is expanded through my entry in much the same way that a champion 
bodybuilder expands the esse of the human body through their innovation and progress.  
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 Meanwhile, those with more visible or profound physical or mental disabilities critique 
the entry standards of the worlds I inhabit, as well as the assumed naturalness of my body’s 
function. I am largely able-bodied and capable of the majority of weightlifting movements and 
the activities associated with academic work. There is an access to the privileging power of 
<natural> that I have that many others do not. Also, being White and cisgendered, I am unlikely 
to have to ever face questions concerning my <natural>ization. These factors of identity play a 
role in each new environment I encounter. These types of recognition become important. 
Undertaking a process where we first critically assess our own place in relation to conventions of 
<natural>, and then encourage revolutionary becoming for the term, can both start to limit the 
harm done through the word’s usage, and expand the populace that has access to its ideographic 
pull. As we attempt to smooth <natural> back out, we have the opportunity to redistribute its 
persuasive power, and actualize the potency of the ideograph in new ways.  
Again, ironically, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) remind us that this smooth space of 
becoming is possible, in part, because of the striation emanating from crystallized constructions 
of the word. If we have no formal understanding of <natural> to critique, and no power structure 
to examine, both our criticism of the term and the ideograph’s potential for healing are moot. 
Like all things, problematic behaviors have their dialectical role in unfolding progression. This 
being said, such a realization should not dissolve our vigilance toward recognizing striation and 
regulation of ideographs. Inviting dangerous and destructive use of terminology only further 
embeds the word within a system of usage we hope to eventually escape. However, recognizing 
that even problematic uses of ideographs have a place within our purpose helps prevent debates 
surrounding the use of <natural> from being reduced to simple if/then scenarios. The external 
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consequences of regulating such a term do not become void, but our avenues of escape are not 
limited only to breaking down all convention.  
In my chosen example, the realization that enforceable standards of <natural>ness can be 
injurious does not make concern for the safety of those who may be otherwise influenced to use 
certain substances less legitimate. If the primary goal is to prevent harm and encourage healing, 
rooting out and destroying all regulation is not alone a viable behavior. Ideographs are not 
required to function as a word reduced to only inclusive and exclusive capabilities, even if this is 
how they are sometimes deployed. Instead, ideographs represent a cultural text rich with 
potential for both becoming and progress. These are the political ingredients required for the 
complicated play between smooth and striated spaces. It may make sense to prevent labeling 
particular foods, substances, and practices as <natural> if doing so reduces the amount of 
ingestion of harmful substances and curbs the suffering of a population. It may also make sense 
to repeal such legislation if it somehow generates a harmful stratification between bodies that 
incur segregation. It is likely that the most just answer is not either of these definitive ends of the 
spectrum.  
The play between smooth and striated does not end, nor should we desire it to. Once we 
reach the point of static agreement on what <natural> is across context (unlikely as this may be), 
its ideographic power dies. With it dies the potential for employing the ideograph within avenues 
of healing and growth. What would remain would only be the skeletal structure of regulation, 
held firmly by an apparatus of capture. However, if this play between smoothness and striation is 
encouraged over practices that simply formalize the term, hope is not inherently tied to any one 
of an ideograph’s determinations. Just as a smooth space may never be enough to save us, 
striation need not be the instrument of our demise. 
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Closing Thought: My Body as Illustration 
As an illustration of the approach I advocate, I end this study by briefly examining an 
implicit question related to the reading of this dissertation. Though I have talked some about my 
experiences, I have not disclosed whether or not I consider myself to qualify as <natural> under 
the definitional standards of bodybuilding that I have shown extend to “regular life.” I have not 
told you whether I am geared or natty. It was my performative intent to avoid making this 
distinction. I have woven wording that obscures easy answers to this question throughout the 
pages of this project to promote the play between smooth and striated spaces. By designating 
myself under either characteristic, I make a decision to enact a conception of the ideograph of 
<natural> that is instrumental and not machinic. This is consequential action. 
 If I present myself as a geared athlete, I perhaps gain further credibility and insight into 
the topic in the eyes of my audience. This would be gained at the cost of a set of presumed 
legal/moral/ethical violations. If I claim <natural>, I free myself of the stigma that comes along 
with a geared or unnatural body identity, but potentially further crystallize problematic 
conceptions of <natural>. Either choice may function to reinforce ideas of what <natural> is 
rather than what it can do. By choosing not to align myself in a category, I force potentially 
productive questions to be asked instead of defaulting to existing answers: Why does a body’s 
<natural> status matter? Who is not <natural> to me? How does my perception of this 
dissertation change if I read it from either of the author’s possible identity designations? What 
shared conclusion might we draw if we substitute the <natural> of bodybuilding to <natural> as 
it is invoked in discussions of the bodies of sexual minorities or the bodies and experiences of 
people with disabilities? This is not to say that failure to identify with a designation is the only 
way, or even necessarily always the most generative way of sparking productive questioning of 
132 
	
ideographic striation. Advocacy through direct recognition of a status of bodily naturalness or 
unnaturalness is necessary as well in many scenarios. Rooting out and recognizing the harmful 
applications of discriminatory language is always an important step in reclaiming or 
reformulating vocabularies. Though I have located many of the places <natural> has been used 
harmfully in this study, there are undoubtedly more bodies and practices negatively affected by a 
designation of unnatural the current regime of ideographic naturalness. Only when these 
experiences are also considered, is a proper machining of <natural> possible. 
In the case of my own bodily naturalness, I employed the three considerations involved in 
the use of ideographic <natural> and determined that not participating in the dichotomy of 
<natural>/unnatural most benefitted the flow I want to be a part of, and also machined the 
terminology toward a more just purpose. The blurriness that comes from the questions arising 
from my choice is the smooth space of liminality that still emanates from the potentially harmful 
existence of a striation of <natural>. When this blurriness is recognized, and the ambiguity of the 
terminology is “captured” not for striation, but questioning of the boundaries of the striation, 
important critical work is being done. From here we are free (in a limited sense) to reconsider 
how future striations might function towards more inclusive, less stigmatized deployments of 
ideographs.  
There are nearly limitless arenas where <natural> has either already had influence, or that 
could benefit from the term’s responsible use. In the not-so-distant future, we will have to 
answer this question in relation to the food we eat, the people who are allowed to remain in this 
country, and a whole range of bodily performances that do not fit conventional performances of 
“normal.” The way we answer these questions about <natural> will determine much about who 
we, as a culture, have chosen to be. In a sense, the way we deal with <natural> is the way we 
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“machine” ourselves and will be influential in the way we write our own esse. We find ourselves 
now at a weighty location in the unfolding temporal <natural> flow. Our decisions matter, and 
our answers to questions like these matter. So, though it is far from definitive, my answer to 
whether my body is <natural> will remain this: What do you mean by <natural>, and what can it 
come to mean? 
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